when Professor Dorr's immense learning and clinical analysis awakened ambition and enthusiasm in this reviewer the book poses few problems. In many places the theory is either exceedingly dense or exceedingly abstract, or both. Consider this sample from the beginning of the chapter discussing policy principles for handling adversity: 'to locate policy principles for policy-making under adversity, clear distinctions between a number of aspects of policies and policy-making is necessary. This is not an easy task, policy-making being as exposed several times, an existential part of national political reality, itself composed of a multiplicity of overlapping and interacting threats.'

Imposition of explicit concepts on amorphous reality carries dangers of falsification, even if the concepts are meant on a tacit level (p. 59).

What is more, there does not seem to be a particularly clear line of argument running through the book. Instead each chapter seems to address a different facet of some still only vaguely specified whole, and then ranges turgidly through ancient history, modern philosophy, the visions of Vietnam, French economic planning, the introduction of a Comnian constitution in Sri Lanka, and so on.

As The Return of the Just the iron has both a dark and a light side. The dark side is personalised by the now universally familiar figure of Darth Vader. The light side is epitomised by the young, well-meaning but ultimately insipid Luke Skywalker. Professor Dorr approximates to neither of these stereotypical figures, but the reader gains an unsparing feeling that his preferred solutions incorporate the kind of powerful central mechanisms which the Darth Vader among us would be delighted to gain control of. Dorr does not place much faith in the citizenship 'to sway on the political sense and good will of populations at large.'

And their political capacities... contrasts much of what it is known and has been experienced historically and is, therefore, somewhere between premature hopes, wishful thinking, and a megalomaniac belief (p. 119).

It could be that Professor Dorr has written a very clever and clever book. But, if so, it is also a difficult work, and one which is read with considerable unease concerning its apparently narrow conceptualisation of democratic political activity.

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BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC CHOICE

Jan-Erik Lane (ed.). Sage, 598.97, 305pp. £25 (cloth), £9.95 (paper)

Jan-Erik Lane has brought together several excellent essays on the social science of bureaucracy, enough to make the book worth commending to postgraduate students and scholars. Lane organizes the collection into three parts: theoretical explorations, empirical studies, and comparative perspectives (a proof-reading error has left floor's essay in Part II in the Contents, but in Part II in the main text - where Part II is also entitled 'normative considerations'). However, the reader should note that the book's title is a partial misnomer since only five of the twelve essays directly address the public choice theory of bureaucracy (the contributions of Lane, de Bruijn, Sørensen, Dunne and Flood).

The other seven essays are a roguing bag of interesting pieces on multi-orientational implementation and design by Chiarella; a useful essay on measuring pro-sociality in bureaucrats by Murray; a clear, empirically informed and orthodox Sylvester essay on comparative administrative systems by Page; two vague typological essays on the nature of contemporary executives by Rose and Peters; a rather obvious essay by Stahlberg on Merit's model of bureaucratic dysfunctionality; and a series of disjointed notes from Aaron Wildavsky replete with his customary vaguely assertive assertion of fallacies, dogmatic one-liners, over-supply of adjectives and awkward syntax - masquerading under the title 'A cultural theory of responsibility'.

Given space limitations this review can focus only on the five essays which deal with public choice theory. The theoretical section opens with Lane's own useful introduction to the concept of bureaucrats. Surveying contemporary theories he identifies five definitional approaches: bureaucracy as unitary, as dysfunctions, as rigidities, as an instrumentality, as a chore, as an over-supply, as a mis-maximisation, and as a private choice, and waste. The orthodox (Weberian understanding of rationality, dysfunctions, rigidity and an instrumentality) and the heretics of the new institutionalism (chores).

Most of the second essay, 'Economic theory of bureaucracy and public good allocation', written by de Bruijn, is a review of the public choice menu. He reviews the limits of neoclassical economics, and its modern successor, the theory of the game, the literature on the limitations of voting mechanisms in revealing authentic preferences for public goods; and the problems of pseudo-markets. The essay will be demanding reading for those without a background in economics; and for those with such a background it is hard to see what purpose it serves for the theory of bureaucracy since it does little more than restate the by now well-known difficulties with preference-revelation and preference-aggregation procedures for decision-making on public goods. For instance, his well-taken point about a core defect in Nozick's model of bureaucracy the assumption that the optimal output and price of public good production could be known, was pointed out in some of the earlier reviews of the model. There is a very good, pan of literature review gathered in de Bruijn's literature review gathering the information required about people, preferences for public goods is the real bottleneck in trying to make public choice market choice and connect with various liberal assumptions. However, it is worth following up this major defect, which suggests the inapplicability of the public choice paradigm to public sector decision-making (and design), de Bruijn ends on the optimistic note that the answers may be found in 'information theory'.

Sørensen's essay, 'Bureaucratic decision-making and the growth of public expenditure', develops some of the necessary components of a dynamic model of budget-making, which transcends the limitations both of the incrementalism theory pioneered by Wildavsky and the comparative statics of Nozick's model. Sørensen's model, and evidence, supports the plausible - it means - argument that bureaucrats may pursue inflated budgets and that they may succeed or fail. It may seem obvious, but part of the good social science theory is to explain why the obvious is as it is. Unfortunately, in none of the theoretical essays is there a discussion of the merits of some of the alternative maxims suggested by critics of the public choice model of bureaucracy (for example, D unwaw's control over the central 'network' of bureau-supervising administrators, or Goodin's model of 'mission committed' bureaucrats).

The two best essays in the book for students and teachers of public administration in the empirical section, with the contributions from the British lake newell goods and professionals, the bureaucrats, Dunne and Flood. Dunne's essay is an excellent summary of the IRC-sponsored bureaucracies project at the University of Oxford. The project reviewed the evidence of the predictions which can be extrapolated from various theories of bureaucracy and the difficulties faced by the researchers in operationalising, let alone testing, the best of the known theories in organisational sociology and public choice. Dunne's essay is a worthwhile account of the predictions which can be extrapolated from various theories of bureaucracy and the difficulties he and his colleagues had in evaluating their merits in British public administration. The results are worth summarizing upon: the application of contingency theory to central British administration is partially successful and partly flawed; various theories of reorganisation are partially confirmed; and the public choice model of bureaucracy, if all as it is operational at all, is shown to be seriously empirically deficient.
The outcome of the pioneering bureaucratic project revisited. Hegel's philosophy: the owl of Minerva has set flight after the illusions of the epoch have wrought their havoc.

Hoad's essay on trends in British public administration in the last twenty years, like Durstein's, useful in theoretical-argumentative and empirical research. His essay helps us the task of reversing the extent to which British administrative trends, a technocratic or, on the contrary, a political causation, have been moved away from the classical Venetian paradigm of monopolistic, functionally organized, three-grade bureaucracy. The ex-ante construction of public expenditure as at the point of consumption for the public choice paradigm of the small-scale competitive bureaucracy, operating on overlapping jurisdictions, and changing users, and the privatization of public enterprises. The story, not unexpectedly, is a mixed one: privatization has occurred, but not in the manner consistent with public choice prescriptions; over-charges have not been removed on the scale expected; new forms of parastatal government have developed, despite attempts at quangolisation; and monopoly inscriptions have remained mostly intact. A sectorial breakdown of policy arenas might have produced a more nuanced picture: for example, have public-choice prescriptions been followed, albeit unintentionally, more in social policy and in public enterprise than in the military-industrial complex? Hoad's essay is especially interesting because it shows that certain public choice trends in practice present the disjunction of the theory: it will be even more intriguing to watch whether the deviation from theory actually increases under a regime publicly sympathetic to the public choice paradigm.

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ADMINISTRATION AS SERVICE — THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Paris, 1987. 130pp. £9.00

The presentation of this OECD report is that increasing administrative responsiveness is an essential challenge for advanced industrial democracies. It recommends the application of "positive rationalism" to public service. It foresees change on a scale that will require decades rather than years. Its tone is consistent and theoretical. There is no mention of public vs. private sector nor emphasis vs. locality. The word "excellence" does not appear. The report is at pains to warn against slavish imitation of successful business methods in a project about nothing less than the future of democracy.

Addressed to policy makers, civil servants, business and the general public, the report continually returns to the responsibility of tackling the problems it describes in isolation. From an understanding of government structures, politics, the sources of democratic decision-making and control, the role of the State in society, and society's values and attitudes to the State. These perceptions are supported by practical ideas because . . . for the client, policy is what happens at the interface with the administration. Readers are helped by a "summary for policy makers", a précis of the main argument and recommendations at the end of each of the five parts of the report. Examples from 17 countries based on interviews with over 500 practitioners are inserted at appropriate points.

There is a growing body of writing and management education aimed at enhancing public service orientation. This report is a glimpse of the scope of its strengths. Our progress in the UK is tempered by the determination to lift the burden of government from the "true" wealth producers. No matter that the "media personification of this burden is one-dimensional. The character of Sir Humphrey Appleby is a wry tribute to Veblen's belief that democracy needs bureaucracy but bureaucracy does not need democracy.

David Head and Richard Rose (eds.)
Public Finance Foundation with Priors Waterhouse. 1987. 150pp. £9.95

This is a simulation manual which should be welcomed by public administration teachers in higher education. It is a report on a public expenditure game, conducted under the auspices of the Public Finance Foundation at Nuffield Park in 1986. In his introduction Edmund Deli notes the lack of academic studies on how "collective decisions on public spending are taken." Therefore decided to simulate the Cabinet at work and see whether the simulation would be sufficiently lifelike to yield useful lessons (p. 1).

A group of academics, all specialists in their field, played the roles of Cabinet ministers, with Dell in the chair as Prime Minister and Richard Rose and David Head as "controllers". Each minister prepared and submitted a "brief" to the Rose for inclusion in the Red Book, outlining their case for the share of the extra £1 billion above that planned in the 1986 White Paper for each of the three years of the 1985-1988 planning cycle. All the rest furniture is large, materials, cabinet discussion and the "blue chamber." There are useful tables summarizing the bids made, a good variety of different ways of constructing paper for the Cabinet and a helpful annex giving advice to teachers on how to use the book in seminars.

All such exercises have to be judged carefully for their educational and academic value. There is little new here for the public policy specialist. There are some nuggets in the chapter by Forster and Head and in the postscript by Jones and Liberman. It is a pity that there were not more reflections on the NHS system in the book. Educationally, the questions raised are: is the topic important enough to warrant a game? Is the simulation grounded close enough to reality to be of value, yet simplified enough to be usable? Does it generate questions, stimulate discussion and enlighten the student?

On the whole, as a teaching aid, the book comes out well in such an assessment. Certainly there are too few simulations on public expenditure (only one, by Burch and Clark, comes to mind). The student will benefit from using the framework developed, if for no other reason than that it should end the period held by undergraduates that public expenditure is a boring and dry. It is, however, flawed in significant respects. Political partnership is lacking. No ideological line was recreated. Dell played the part of a Wilsonian cabinet chairman — not present in his own case. Does this ring true in the days of convention politics and the powerful Treasury? No. The academics-controllers were praised by