EXCELLENT social-scientific research and writing on contemporary political violence are rare. These two books, with the exceptions of some good essays in the generally better McElrath collection, confirm this harsh judgment. The obstacles to high-quality research in this field are legion. The contamination of unreliable sources, official and un official, and the presence of maximum bias inhibit controversy among every chronicler, let alone analysts, of political violence. However, comparable obstacles have not prevented high-quality scholarship in cognitive fields, such as the study of crime or civil disobedience. But much of Wilkinson's book, albeit revised, extended, and updated, is unfortunately all too typical of the political violence literature: it manages to combine factual inaccuracy, attitudinal psychology, and loose causal reasoning in a way which does little for the professional reputation of social science.

Let us start with factual inaccuracy. Chapter 10 of Wilkinson's book, entitled Civil War is mostly a review of British security policy in Northern Ireland. If Wilkinson's inaccuracy and errors of judgment in this chapter are representative of his research on terrorism and security policy outside of the U.K., then the author will have damaged his reputation at an expert on terrorism. He begins by describing the conflict in Northern Ireland, unequivocally, as an incipient or exposed civil war. One might quibble with this judgment in light of the fact that far fewer people died in the Irish Civil War of 1922-23 than have died in Northern Ireland since 1969, but civil wars are only described as such when they are terminated or "gone abattoiral". However, what is far more critical in Wilkinson's amazingly inaccurate appreciation of the events preceding and preceding the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland. He states, categorically, that internment was introduced in 1972, although he does not specify the month or day. Internment was in fact introduced on the 9th August, 1971. It seems that this error in Wilkinson's part is not a trivial one or a typographical mistake because he repeats it twice on the same page and more significantly because he builds a theory around his erroneous dating. "When one looks at the escalation of the terrorism in Northern Ireland in 1972, with 467 killed, it is easier to understand why the British government was fully prepared to support a determined crackdown on the terrorists by the Army, combined with the use of internment, introduced in 1972". There was indeed an escalation of political violence in Northern Ireland in 1972. It is perhaps a matter of detail whether 467 rather than 467
467 people were murdered that year. But what is not often noted is Wilkinson's interpretation of the introduction of internment, which is critically dependent upon this later belief that internment was introduced in 1972. In 1971 the total number of deaths due to political violence was 175, and in 1972 the total was 474. In other words, the number of deaths almost tripled in the year after the introduction of internment, and, not, as Wilkinson's interpretation suggests, as it would have been introduced. This mistake is an example of his propensity to engage in wishful thinking: he wants to believe that British security policy has been competent, and that "no other army in the world could have performed the internal security role in Northern Ireland with such humanity, restraint and effectiveness." He is tempted to write history as he thinks it ought to have occurred. The facts, as illustrated in the graph below, are that the death toll in Northern Ireland was at its highest (always over 150 deaths per annum) between 1971 and 1976, i.e., the period in which internment was in force for most of the

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1 Wilkinson is relying on figures from (R. C. Peace Office which differ from other calculations such as those found in the New Ireland Forum, Taoiseach of Ireland, Weekly, Northern Ireland, 24 April 1988). The breakdown of those killed in 1972 was: 166 Catholic civilians, 61 IRA, 24 RNZAF civilians, 38 British soldiers, 46 local security forces (mainly R. U. L. guards and Volunteers). A.D. Gilmore and Lisk (1973, Political Murder in Northern Ireland, London) and J. B. Bosley and T. Hatter (1956, British and Catholic people, Puritans) conclude that many more Catholics were killed than Protestants in the early phases of political violence in the 1920s, both absolute and relative, and yet internment was mainly targeted at Republican and the L.R.A.

2 Northern Ireland Forum, ibid.

3 In the second edition of his book Wilkinson (1973, p. 150) credited "the abandonment of internment was an act of incredible folly, a self-inflicted wound at the heart of the civil authorities. It was offensive and unjust. It was not caused by the police, the Army, and the community at large feuds and misunderstandings are as likely to upset the streets in broad daylight." This passage, to my knowledge, has been toned down from the second edition. Although it is an internment bogey on the origins of Wilkinson's ultraliberal thinking about the "success" of internment in 1972-73. In the second edition, Wilkinson indicates, again suggesting that he ever held a contrary opinion, that he has been persuaded by Army sources that internment, perhaps, was used to maintain, "... does not help towards the betterment of the situation and, of internment, is a useful police and an efficient weapon for the police and... and the decision to... become 'denying triers' for the compelling..." P. E. S. (1980, p. 199). P. E. S. states a third edition came to 1980, but Wilkinson still holds the same abuse, the emergency police, police management, and other features of British security policy between 1977 and 1983.

The review article "In the Press" he warns the reader that he has tried to keep "even references to academic opposition to an understandable minimum." In the case of chapter 10 which mostly deals with Northern Ireland the unambiguous academic apparatus amounts to implicit reference in criticism than a Rightist writing in the Daily Telegraph in praise of the book by Ditsch and Lewin mentioned above in footnote 1, one citation from the Economist, the citation from the explanatory memorandum to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, two other citations from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in the terms of a consideration. All of these references were published before 1977 - since which date there has been considerable social science research on Northern Ireland.

Wilkinson simply asserts that the information yielded through these sources has been valuable. My personal experience of such intelligence gathering in this country is that my personal knowledge from Euing and to the police intelligence service in Northern Ireland, I was told by a police inspector afterward whether I was a Communist. The citation was made after a search of my files had revealed that a Labour Party member of the Council of the University of Oxford (United policy under the Norman Stalker novel...)

See for example C. Everett and H. Haines, 1985, The Prevention of Terrorism Act: The Case for Reform, National Council for Civil Liberties, London, as well as the familiar sound of arguments made by us from students of the Public Administration Department the Conservative Education Party - especially during the Hanley period as Shadow Home Secretary.
powers because of the number of arrests which they have instigated—rather than, for example, the number of convictions which they have produced—which is strange coming from a defender of the rule of law. The fundamental point is that all of these controversial assertions might have good argument to support them but Wilkinson does not provide them. Political scientists or criminologists should consider rival explanations of given phenomena, rival evaluations of the effectiveness of given policy measures, and official and unofficial data for and against a given proposition before coming to a reasoned conclusion. Unfortunately, on the evidence of his writing on Northern Ireland, Paul Wilkinson systematically neglects these elementary customs of social science.

There are two further examples of misleading statements, amongst the many which litter his text and could have been chosen for illustration, which confirm woeful thinking, or lack of careful research on Wilkinson's part. The first is a misleading statement about the opposition parties' positions on Northern Ireland. He states that "we should remember that it is now official Labour Opposition policy to plan for the withdrawal of British troops and the totally impracticable panacea of a united Ireland. It is true that the Liberals, the Daily Mirror and the 'Troops Out' lobby are the only other vocal supporters of this line." But it is misleading to suggest that Labour is planning for the withdrawal of British troops because Labour's policy is not for the "unification of Ireland by consent." Until consent is forthcoming, the United population the unionists will stay, i.e., the troops will stay, for the present. The future Wilkinson's judgment on the Liberal's absolute on the untenable assumption that a satisfactory Liberal concordance results in a Liberal party policy. Even if these statements were not misleading they hint at a certain lack of democratic coherence because his description suggests that the Labour and Liberal parties and leadership of the Daily Mirror are representative of a considerable proportion of the island's public opinion—how the electorate would regard his strange amalgam of the expression "the only other vocal supporters of this line." Another example is Wilkinson's statement that "The Northern Ireland conflict is exceptional in Western Europe because it is a classic case of ethnic minority terrorism: the Provisional IRA, a tiny minority of the Catholic population of Northern Ireland, seeks to 'liberate' a territory in which the majority refuse to be 'liberated.' " The grammatical meaning of this sentence suggests that there are no other examples of ethnic minority terrorism in Western Europe. So much for violent activities amongst Basques, Bretons and Genoese... The charitable interpretation of the meaning

Wilkinson, 1986, p. 139. The same strange propriety is also evident in another passage where Wilkinson tells the reader that Britain's policy is "doomed but unjustly winning the battle against terrorism". One of the reasons he believes this is because the opinions of the smaller parties are that "between IRA and Sinn Fein, the IRA has been the more efficient" (p. 138). My emphasis. Surely the relevant indicators ought to be the violence or terrorism or the number of political casualties. Even if the persons convicted are correctly convicted under the political violence provisions of Diplock courts, for example, Wilkinson's slip with respect to something about Diplock courts—the belief widespread at least to be章程 in a Diplock court may well amount to a paradox.

The reviewer does not believe that Labour's policy seeking the unification of Ireland by consent is either desirable in principle and supports the Anglo-Irish agreement as a singular move towards power-sharing within Northern Ireland—of B. O'Leary, 1986, p. 146. The Anglo-Irish Agreement: full, or state of off Westategy Policy, 14, 1.

Wilkinson, 1986 p. 166. The other fowel editions of the Labour Party, the Alliance and the Troops Out Movement are on the same page.

Wilkinson, 1986, pp. 194-195. The entire section has been quoted to avoid duplication in the text.

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WRITTEN ARTICLES

Wilkinson intended to convey is that the Northern Ireland conflict is exceptional because the IRA's social base is a minority of the relevant territorial area. But even this interpretation would make the sentiment false because it is also true of the Basques and Israelis that the majority of the population in the relevant territorial area do not want to be "liberated" by the relevant political party. Wilkinson is a poor scholar of Northern Ireland and weak on comparative analysis.

The second dominant feature of Wilkinson's book is his penchant for "armchair psychologizing" and "lame" moralizing. For instance, he argues that "It is important to remember that the commission needs to get the kind of police service it deserves, both in terms of public support and control, and in the amount the community is prepared to spend on manpower and equipment. For example, the rebellions laid down for the full-time police establishment in major British cities are almost certainly too low." Why, yes, and we, and was can can say so this basis gone? We are also told that "recent judicial decisions in America, for example, concerning the Watergate conspiracy, and in Britain regarding the Clive Ponting Affair, would seem firmly to dispose of the claim that judicial independence has been subverted by corruption and political interference." Again, how should one respond to this kind of assurance?

The Americans can thank their stars for their independent judiciary, but the British have to rely on the incongruous possibility that rebellious juries—despite vetting—will reject the law's two independent judgments of the files of Justice McGowan.

Indeed, some of Wilkinson's vitriolic assertions have one believing that he cannot have related his additions to (or his subtractions from) his second edition with a great deal of care. Does he really believe that "Risks such as those in Britain and Transkei 1981 and Hartswater 1985... show it is impossible to control the dangerous and volatile force of collective violence."14 Does he believe that, "Despite some of the assertions that under terrorist humiliation, 'a cult of blood' and guns is crossed and brutalizing youths can be counted on to the life of terrorist motives, they perform their tasks in a kind of sacrificial ecstasy"?15 Any terrorist who imagines himself to be a sacrifice or one who makes a sacrifice in the cause of his cause is likely to be an incompetent terrorist who will either be树mally cut off or be tried by the security forces in which case he will have no hope of the pursuer's state of mind when he sacrifice the deed. This possibility is one reason why competent terrorist organizations try to imitate the ideological and practical techniques of professional armies. They seek to train people to kill "professionally", routinely, and with the minimum of emotion rather than in a state of sacrificial ecstasy.

Similarly, the reader must ask whether Wilkinson really believes that the philosophers of Sartre and Engels have been the most influential of the various ideologies in the contemporary world.15 Questionnaire survey of the key philosophers who have influenced terrorism might produce interesting results—such as how few of them have read any philosophy at all, whether directly or indirectly—but we can be confident that Wilkinson's conclusion would be flawed. Nationalism, terrorism, as well as, as he knows, are far more prevalent and powerful than those of the ultra-left in Western Europe, and while their ideas may well be directly derived from versions of Western

17 Wilkinson, 1986, p. 72, p. 103.
philosophy, the texts of Sartre and Fanon are not found in a diluted form amongst the arguments of their apologists. Let alone by the terrorists' holy of holies. We can also be confident that the impact of Sartre and Fanon has been greater in the salons and S.C.R.s of Western Unitarities than in the hills and forests of the Third World.

By comparison the collection of essays in the Merkit collection show greater methodological rigour, scholarly research and detail. Merkit divides his collection of twelve essays into two parts. Part One, Apeap of Political Violence is supposed to illustrate "one of the newer methods, namely, the psychological or socio-psychological approach that centers on individual motivations and the factors that might account for them." But this omission of the book, presumably made to give some rationale for various international conference papers, is unnecessary, and misrepresents the book's contents. First, Goode's essay on the U.D.A. and the Provisional I.R.A. and Clark's essay on patterns of E.T.A. violence in Part One focus upon rational explanations of terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque country. Unlike the study of irrationality in the exclusive province of psychologists and social psychologists then, the essays in Part One are not just "psychological" as those in Part Two. Second, there is little that is "new" about the psychology employed in Part Two. Not only is there little that is new in the "method", there is little that is original in the methodological errors that are made.

The editor's first essay "Approaches to the Study of Political Violence" is disorganised. It makes an unsuccessful attempt to arrive at an operational definition of political violence, which amounts to no more than a checklist of common questions with which to compare the methods, victims, addresses, social bases, organisation and goals of violent political groups. These dimensions are indispensable to comparative analysis but do not add up to an operational definition of political violence promised by the author. The second objective of the essay—categorising approaches to the study of political violence by units of analysis—to also unclearly pursued. We are also offered, as pendant, nuggets of wisdom such as the following: "It seems plausible to assume (but it needs to be tested in comparative studies) that violence may have a key role in the ongoing process of redefinition" and "there has always been some speculation as to the motives that might drive a person to violent behaviour, but relatively little empirical work on empirical theory." Merkit is however aware that terrorism political violence based on religious and ethnic conflict produces the heaviest toll of casualties, but spoils the value of the insight with the shared suggestion that rivalry among nationalist guerrilla groups is "rare, whereas political terror organisations in the same country are very likely to compete." He notes that the Irish-Americans and the I.R.A. are exceptions to his generalisation, but any competent observer of world news bulletins from Zimbabwean, Eritrean, Salvadorian and Cambodian events would suggest that Merkit's generalisation sweeps more than it generalises.

Richard Drake's essay on "Julian Eynol and the Ideological Origins of the Radical Right in Contemporary Italy" (chapter 2) is an informative account of the career and the ideas of a neo-fascist ideologue but does not, as one might have expected in a...
collection of this sort, systematically address the question of the impact of Eoka's historic ideas on the revival of the Italian far right.

Adrian Gourke's essay on "Loyalist and Republican Perceptions of the Northern Ireland Conflict: the U.D.A. and the Provisional I.R.A." (chapters 3) and Roberts Clark's two essays "Patterns of E.T.A. Violence 1968-1980" (chapter 4) and "Patterns in the Lives of E.T.A. Members" (chapter 10) presented in Part II (and out because they are empirical, theoretically informed and careful to avoid inexpressed armchair speculation. Gourke explicitly states that it is his purpose to show that Loyalist and Republican territorians are "altogether more susceptible to rational explanation than Wilkinson's model of terrorism implies". He states this objective with ease. He also confirms, for Northern Ireland at least, the Hannah Arendt's well known argument a true: because existence is instrumental, those who wield it are consciously compelled to justify themselves. He documents the exploitation of Republicans and Loyalists to seek legitimacy among their social bases, real or alleged. Clark also demonstrates that E.T.A.'s violence is not random, senseless killing and wounding. Rather, acts carefully chosen with great attention to their political impact in their surrounding political environment" and that "most states are well within the range of functioning and sane human感应. 22 Clark's second essay is also an admirable example of what can be attempted by a political scientist concerned to construct data base on terrorism from Police records, official data, media materials and interviews. His sample, which he carefully notes his limitations, allows him to falsify some of the standard assumptions about the social origins of E.T.A. recruits—namely the idea that they are "hopelessly delinquent social 'marginals'. Nonetheless, despite the very considerable merits of their essays, both Gourke and Clark depend 23 for the rationality of political violence as their chosen research area but that because they went psychology and social psychology from their interpretations, but rather because they fall into the trap of understanding terrorism as a rational animal, as an "innocent" organization whose behavior can be explained as the value-maximizing choices of their policy elites. However, it is worth emphasizing that terrorist organizations are organizations, and that "organizational behavior" can only be understood as the rationalized actions of various subgroups and factions, of operationally successful standard operating procedures, and considerate local variations in beliefs, motivations and the implementation of formal goals. It is important to avoid the assumption that all terrorist incidents are carefully planned and executed from above.

The essays in Part III are allegedly told together by a focus upon individual motives and motivations. The two essays by Weinberg and Basaqin and Elia Derron on Italian terrorism (chapters 5 and 6) are much more structural and sociological that the editor's classification suggests. Weinberg's essay establishes some of the salient features which must enter into any analysis of the Italian state's susceptibility to terrorism—the characteristics of the established political elites, the consequences of the fascist and resistance traditions, the widespread perceptions of the state as weak and inefficient, the decline in deference towards traditional institutions, the P.C.I.'s exposure to reformism, and a profound generation conflict among both the right and left. His argument is explicitly directed against Williamson and Lauerer 24 who have both


22 April 1967, p. 281.

23 N. Lawner 1977: Terrorism, Wedgewood and Norberg.
argued that liberal democracies are especially prone to terrorism because of their civil liberties and openness. Neiße suggests that "all this may be true, but the argument does not explain why some democracies have been more subject to terrorism than others." 24 He is right that this key question is one which social scientists should address.

Pasquino and De la Porte are also concerned to establish "the most important problems for sociological analysis." 25 They reject the popular explanations of Italian left-wing terrorism, the conspiracy and the psychopathological theory. The conspiracy thesis they reject is the idea that Italian terrorism is the manifestation of non-Italian states. They do not deny that there have been many conspiracies in Italy, but they insist on the idea that all terrorist organizations are conspiracies. Instead they favor the idea that some sociological explanations of terrorism, like the choice made by a collective action, and terrorism as a symptom of dysfunction in the system. The functionalist and holistic methodological assumptions implicit in these formulations are not considered because they are translated into intelligent arguments. The first thesis suggests that Italian left-wing terrorism is a by-product of the P.C.I.'s reformism, a reaction against Eurocommunism and the historic compromise by "surplus activists." The problems here are twofold: the timing of events does not support the thesis and it cannot be said that a very substantial component of the Italian left-wing terrorist groups is due to the P.C.I.'s inconsistency that emerged during that activity. The second "analysis" of terrorism is the most important of Interpol's and the fact of political mobilisation. Pasquino and De la Porte conclude with the "preliminary explanation" that left-wing terrorism in Italy is due to the fact of terrorism in the system and at the same time of the conscious decision of some groups to resort to armed activity in the belief that legal avenues for the transformation of the system were no longer available and that, indeed, a viable, authoritarian strain was in the making. 26 The reader is counselled to await their further research. 27

Two essays follow on political violence in West Germany, the first by Klaus Wiesmair on "The Political Socialisation of West German Terrorists," and the second by the editor on "Rollerball or Nazi-War Violence?" The primary feature of West German terrorism is the way its scale and its direct violent consequences of its acts in comparison with Israeli, Basque or Italian terrorism 28 and the way in which the E.A.F. 29 faction was in contrast with terrorist movements elsewhere in Western Europe. The "ideology and actions of the West German terrorists also suggests the appropriateness of sociological explanations of their formation and development a task which Wiesmair only partially succeeds in foiling. He argues that West German terrorism was an unintended by-product of the student movement in the "counter-culture" of West Berlin and that most terrorist recruits came from the student movement. 30

24 Neiße, 1988, p. 136
25 Pasquino, 1988, p. 170
26 Pasquino, 1988, p. 182
27 Wiesmair, 1988, p. 159
28 Wiesmair, 1988, p. 159
29 Wiesmair, 1988, p. 159
30 Wiesmair, 1988, p. 159
upper middle-class. We are given such details as "every fourth terrorist, over the age of fourteen, grew up in a broken home", but in the absence of comparable data for their West German contemporaries from analogous social positions such information is meaningless. What has happened to the basic idea of a "control group"—nearly fundamental to applied sociology, social psychology and political science? But after similar sophisticated data presentation on the biographies and assumed psychobiographies of future terrorists Wasmund confesses that "no single set of circumstances can be identified in the primary socialisation process that would necessarily lead to a terrorist career". Yet this statement, although very plausible, fits ill with the assertion he has made only two sentences previously: "nearly all the biographies of the terrorism display unusual family and psychodynamic factors."

While many will find the psychological and psychoanalytical assumptions in Wasmund's case study of the terrorists' group dynamics compelling, arguments such as the following are neither scientific nor plausible: "the decision to go underground was generally preceded by a phase in which such a step was prepared for consciously or unconsciously." The notion that a longer departing for West Berlin is unconsciously preparing for a terrorist career is both teleological and absurd. What is also very unclear is how terrorists' group dynamics differ from other groups' dynamics apart from the fact the terrorism group have more reasons for thinking that their personal security is in jeopardy. To be told that "in the cells of the terrorist under-ground a friend-enemy mentality exists which is typical of all totalitarian political groupings" is neither revelation nor plausible. Many non-totalitarian groupings, such as academics, accountants, liberal politicians and actors have friend-enemy mentalities, their own jargon, stereotypes, mindguards and processes of identification, integration and groupthink. Wasmund concludes that it would be "an exaggeration to say that terrorists are in many ways victims of group thinking." He does not establish this assertion, but he does, unintentionally, go a long way towards showing that West German terrorists were amongst many other things, bad thinkers. If they were victims of anything they were victims of stupidity.梅克尔 in the "Neo-Nazi right is also unintentionally comforting, because it shows us that there is little reason to be kept awake at night by these thugs who resemble English football hooligans in every ugly particular and so far are equally incapable of serious political or terrorist organisations. The Ostbeförderung, despite its horror, merely confirms this assessment.

The scene of the book then shifts from Western Europe, and we are treated to an essay by Peter Waldman on "Guerrilla Movements in Argentina, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Uruguay" (chapter 9). This essay is a provisional attempt to establish some hypotheses about the formation, propagation and changes of success of guerrilla groups in Latin America. Waldman argues that three factors are much overvalued in accounting for the success and failure of such movements—the particular ideologies of the guerrillas, their organisation, and the impact of Castro's Cuba and multi-national networks. He argues that the social composition of these movements is strikingly

20 Merkl, 1986, p. 204.
homogeneous—they are made up of whites and half-breeds (rather than Indians), youth with higher education, and contains fewer working-class members. He bases his explanation of their formation upon three sets of motivations. First, material-economic motivation are assuaged by the dashing of heightened expectations—frequent in the history of the continent. Second, historical-ideological traditions are especially likely to make an impact upon radicalized youth—the axiom that the young are more radicalized and more ideological, and as such among which many authors seek to take as self-evident. And third, political-economic circumstances such as the failure of a reform movement or programme are likely to precipitate guerrilla activity. His emphasis upon guerrilla failure or success fundamentally upon assumptions about the importance of legitimacy. He argues that the guerrilla fails when they underestimate the importance of middle-class support, and they see when they assume that the prerequisite of repression will be beneficial to their movement. Wahlman’s data on guerrilla organizations and materialist-materialistic/materialism will not be impressed with Wahlman’s pure arguments—which still rely upon the importance of popular legitimacy. Guerrillas succeed if and only if the state’s coercive apparatus is fragmented, and in the case of Latin American countries that protest is far more heavily dependent upon the conflict of American foreign policy and indigenous ruling class cohesion than it is upon popular fluctuations.

Andreas Ashcraft’s essay in “Social-ethnic Conflict and Paramilitary Organizations in the Near East,” chapter 11, a survey of several paramilitary organizations in the Near East which have been active during and after World War II. Unlike Wahlman, he is far more concerned with organizational materialist explanations of the success of guerrilla terrorism movements. He demonstrates that the so-called urban or city guerrilla is assumed to fail without a consensual base, and also that the country-side must be well coordinated by a group of dedicated or at least devoted grandchildren of the movement. If the paramilitary organization is successful in maintaining itself, and formations that recall “ethnical community” in social context. This essay was informative, although the review was privileged by the assertion that “Obviously, the paramilitary organization is not simply paramilitary organization.”

The editor’s concluding essay begins with a defensive note: “This was not intended to be a reevaluation of countries’ policies directed by foreign affairs, which is the material that constitutes the majority of what can be expected from the volume collection of essays which he has brought together.” As with Wilkinson, Merkl’s undoubted analytical capacities seem to have been identified as more the nature of the materials he studies. From the premise that “the anticipations and uncertainties threat of left-wing terrorism can be expected to single out leaders of society and business organizations,” it is simply wrong, especially the basis of the essays which he has just stated, for Merkl to conclude that “The Way We German’s terrorism seems to have been more systematic, with the authorities of Herkimer, Schleyer, and Junger Pinto, two figures at the very top, while the Italians have for the most part been鸾巢 with kidnappings of less prominent figures, bomb robberies and extortions.”

12 Merkl. 1986, p. 312
14 Merkl. 1986, p. 115
nearly major establishment figures even if they are not household names; and perhaps
systematically is the last thing of which the R.A.F. should be accused. But the editor is
also careless elsewhere. When writing of Northern Ireland, Marder writes: "In fact, the
officers on both sides are self-chosen executioners who have rarely suffered the other
side's aggression on either their own bodies or on 9 out of 10 of close kin and friends." 19
These can be no quarrel with the expression "self-chosen executioners" but one would
like to know how Marder derived the alleged "fact" that the terrorists and their friends
and kin have only rarely suffered from the other side's aggression. It may be true, but
it sounds like wishful thinking (perhaps the commendation of mysterious organisations).
There is quite sufficient factual evidence with which to condemn the R.A.F. and the
U.D.A. without making up "reputable facts" as we go along.

With luck analytical scholars continued to make the social science of political
violence more rigorous, and prescriptive scholars concerned to make liberal
democracies" more able to understand, withstand and defeat terrorist attacks, from
wherever they come, will learn something from the defects of Wilkinson's book, and
the flaws in some of the essays edited by Marder. The essays by Gurrke and Carriere, and
with qualifications, those of Weinberg and Pasquinio and Della Poste, are promising
signs that the study of political violence by academics can make methodological and
empirical progress. It is a worthwhile task. After all, as Jose Ortega y Gasset points in
his book *The Revolt of the Masses*: "Civilization consists in the attempt to reduce violence
to the almost zero, the civil argument".

Bobono O'Searr

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19 Marder, 1984, p. 154.