ABSTRACT

ANALYSING PARTITION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION AND EXPLANATION

Political partitions should be carefully distinguished from secessions, de-colonizations and disengagements—though they may accompany these phenomena. Political partitions involve a fresh cut, an at least partially novel border, ripped through at least one national community’s homeland. Partitions of national and multinational politics may be distinguished, as may external and internal partitions. External partitions have been rarer than suggested in conventional accounts, and explanations of their occurrence are evaluated.

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ANALYSING PARTITION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION AND EXPLANATION
Brendan O’Leary

WORKING MATTERS: PARISING PARTITION

partition n. & v. n., 1. division into parts, esp. Polit. of a country with spawal areas of government. 2. a structure dividing a space into two parts, esp. a light interior wall, v. 1. divide (part of a room etc.) with a partition. 2. partitioned adj. partition n. partition (n.) [ME. f. OE. l. parting-on (as PARTITE)] (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1967: 668).

partition n. 1 (a) the action of paring: the gauze of being parted; DIVISION 2: something that divides, e.g. an interior dividing wall: 3. one of the parts or sections of a whole.

partition (n.) (1652) i.a. to divide into parts or shares b. to divide (as a country) into two or more territorial units having separate political status 2: to separate or divide by partition as a wall—often used with off partition n. partitioned (adj.) (1400) an advocate of political partition. (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed., 2003: 904).

The standard dictionaries of English suggest that partition and division are synonyms. Partition, in a general sense, is the division of an entity into parts. It may be analytical: a mathematician partitioning one side of an expression to develop a proof divides nothing in the physical world, even though the deductions may be recorded in writing. But partition may be actual: something that exists is divided: independent of what observers think, a unified entity is divided into parts, as when a butcher dismembers a sheep’s body. Partition may also be subjective: one observer testifies to the division of an entity into parts, but another may deny that it was a unified entity.

A political partition objectively divides a previously unified territorial entity into two or more parts, which may be marked by borders, coupled in new or old, and spatially ordered, for example in demarcated areas, perhaps accompanied by fences, walls, patrols or border wire, or punctuated with official posts where passports or visas may be demanded. Reactions to a political partition are subjective, but in a systematic manner—there will be proponents, opponents and the indifferent, who are always with us.

The notions of “unfastening” and “tearing” usefully metaphorically capture the two major types of political division of territory. The first is to separate using a previously organized mechanism, that is along a previous ordered line of divisions, “un-zipping” is the most efficient unfastening. Political unfastening unweaves time to a previous territorial order, where there was no unity. That is the goal of a secession. Political tearing, by contrast, involves a fresh cut, a rip, a gash, a slash—with remarkable lack or skill will it resemble unfastening. Tearing is what happens in a political party. The blood and guts spilled before, in, and after partition are not dulled by any anesthetic.

These metaphors underpin the claim that a political partition should be defined as a fresh border cut through at least one community’s national homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns or authorities (adapted from O’Leary, 2001: 54). The purpose of a political partition is to regulate or resolve a national, ethnic or communal conflict.

The difference between “cutting always” and “unfastening” does not convey all the attributes of partition or secession, or all their typological differences. But consider how partitions are treated as “tears”. What are they? Are they the freshness, the novelty, the brutality, and the artificiality of dividing a “national” territory, a homeland, and a province. The partition of Ireland and of Ulster were protested this way, by Irish nationalists and especially by those Ulster unionists whose counties were not left in the UK. The opponents of partition in India and Ireland used medical metaphors: “an operation, an amputation, a dismemberment or a vivisection” (Chatter, 1999: 168), or suggested that it would be performed on a “dissecting table” (Cannody, 1975). Pre-modern dynasties treated lands as real estate, and their peoples as herds of human capital, so, in feudal and patrimonial regimes, “partition” had no political meaning outside of estate law; and land divisions were not the subject of debates over their national public legitimacy. The “Partitions of Poland” (1772, 1793 and 1795) that terminated in the removal of the ancient kingdom from the world’s maps changed historical terminology. The tripartite carve-up generated the pejorative as-sociations of partition (Mansergh, 1997: 32). The denunciation of Catharism, Freideck and Maria Theresia (the only one of the three not deemed ‘Great’) forbade the legitimacy of nationalist preoccupations: in each nation there is a homeland in which it is entitled to govern itself. It also foreclosed the legitimacy of imperialist acquiescence and of territorial conquest.

The treatment of political partition as “tearing” became standard, outside the distinctive circles of British imperial statecraft and apologies for that craft—through which there are signs of empathetic recuperation today among those who would admire on US global engagements. But most partitionists propose this policy in political image. If Iriage is the allocation of treatment to patients to maximize the number of survivors, amputation is individual-level triage, the cutting off or rotted or bleeding limbs that might otherwise kill the patient.

1 This definition generally resonates with those who have opposed partitions, especially by rights, but is no way it is defended. The proposed partition is not the claim that ordinary usage is correct, but the claim that it should be used in the social and historical sciences. Contrary to the linguistic, philosophers, who valorized ordinary usage, it is sensible to improve existing terms—Nott (1805) argued that not from some misguided authority. The effort to impose a geometric version of standard English, but to add empirical exploration and political evaluations of the same kind, and to avoid continuing with others.

2 Some claim that the partitions of Poland helped create a popular Polish identity where one had not previously existed. Critics amongst the ancillary (see Kaplan, 1972; Lukacs, 1986). Regulation. The Government of Poland acted in accordance with an act, to stop their production by building a Polish national corporation that would import Poland to repair its consumption by means.
Partition, to finish our metaphorical and medical classifications, is a violation of the integrity of the body politic for its opponent. For its proponents it is essential crisis-survival management, but with the remarkable claim that all the entities will be better off. There is the promise that they can separate Siamese twins. Both sides accept that a "fresh cut" is involved; the difference is that the proponents hope for surgical precision, which opponents know is not possible.

This account of the metaphors that surround partition may be met with the observation that secessions are proposed, and opposed, with the same analogical battery—of cuts, tears, slashes and rips. Granted, political argument is not unemittingly tidy, and metaphors from one type of action may be deliberately applied in another, because that may be useful propaganda. But secession is promoted and opposed as "unexceptionable", dividing along a previously established line of division. Opponents of a secession forget that the secessionist unit historically joined the existing system, and were therefore not always "part of us". Proponents remember a prior territorial status, and insist that past marriage—whether performed for love, under the shotgun, for dynastic politics, or under coercion, or induced by bribery—implies a right of divorce.

Partition, on this account, involves the truncation of at least one prior unit, even if it involves the extension of others. The partition of Germany after the second world war included its division into two units, West and East, the transfer of prior German national territory to France, Poland and the USSR, and the return of recently "obtained" German national territory in the Sudetenland, and elsewhere. The extension of prior states or provinces is best known as "annexation"—protested as "partition" by the loser(s). Partition involves some new lines on the map, either externally (on the edges of a sovereign state) or internally (within such a state). There is some novel part of the new line(s) of demarcation. Though partitions may be glossed with historical fictions, not all their edges are old. Six such fresh cuts are illustrated here (and four of these are illustrated in figure 1).

1. The partition of Ireland (1920). This was executed on county lines which did not sharply or otherwise demarcate national, ethnic or religious boundaries, and which did not, except in the case of the southern borders of County Down and Armagh, correspond with the border of the historic province of Ulster, which in 1920 had, in any case, no legislative, judicial or executive significance (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995; ch. 1). The partition was a novel border.

2. The partition of Hungary (1920). The treaty of Trianon (1920) partitioned Hungary in the course of "disabling" the Hungarian component of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In doing so it neither respected Hungary's borders within the old empire, nor any prior political or administrative conception of Hungary.

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* Hungary, which had helmed itself to Germany in 1920, restored itself with Allied help within its pre-Annexation boundaries; it exercised an associated secession.
3. The partition of Kurdistan (1920-1923). The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) proposed the formation of an independent Kurdistan, and gave the overwhelmingly Kurdish Ottoman Province of Mosul the right to join it, but the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which ratified Kemal Atatürk's military victories, extinguished this nascent Kurdistan, which was partitioned between the novel entities of Brish mandate Iraq, French mandate Syria, and Kemalist Turkey.

4. The partition of India (1947). This was also known as the partition of Punjab and Bengal, and was executed by Radcliffe’s commission. It created a novel border separating India from two entities, West and East Pakistan. Radcliffe’s “award” during the partition of Bengal in 1947 conceded the argument of the Indian National Congress (1947) that Hindus, the smallest units for which census figures had been published, were the most acceptable units around which to organize partition (Chater, 1999, 191). But these Hindus were police stations, or criminal law jurisdictions; they did not define the edges of Bengal’s national or ethnic or religious homeland(s) or communities, nor were they units of self-government; and in the interests of con- figuration, Radcliffe’s award did not (and could not) always award a share with the re- vant Hindu or Muslim majority to their appropriate state.

5. The partition plans for Palestine (1937 and 1948). Neither the Peel Commission of 1937, nor the partition proposals of the United Nations of 1941, radically dif- ferent from one another, respected prior Ottoman or British Mandate administrative boundaries.

6. The partition of Cyprus (1974). Executed by the Turkish army, this partition cre- ated a novel political border, one that had not existed under British or Ottoman rule, or within independent Cyprus.

These illustrations support the understanding that partitions are fresh cuts. But are they merely anecdotal propaganda? Why should such care be taken over the definiti- tion of partition? Why should we not work with a broader definition of partition, as involving the division of an entity into two or more units having separate political status? The answer is that the coding of cases of partition necessarily affects evaluations of its frequency, of its explanations, and of its justifications.

2. DEFINING PARTITION

Partition in recent scholarship
Consider the disensus, and slight touch of carelessness, on how to define partition among otherwise industrious and very intelligent scholars of the subject. We may begin with a recent quantitative analysis by Nicholas Sambanis (2000). It is very in- teresting work, and many of its arguments against partitions are persuasive. But, on my account, it confuses partition and secession, which renders its assessment sub- spect. The following are just some of Sambanis’s more overtly controversial inclu- sions in the category of late twentieth century partitions: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Russia- Chechnya, Somalia-Somaliland, Yugoslavia-Croatia (1991-92), and China-Taiwan. In most of these cases secessions were at-
tempered, or took place, within existing political borders which had previously recog-
nized the relevant national homelands (Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, South Ossetia, Chechnya, and Crimea),[6] or around a previous and recent political boundary (Somali-
land).[7] The Croatian succession of 1991 was militarily contested, but there was no attempted partition until Serbian irregulars backed by Belgrade held the Krajina. In the last of these instances, China-Taiwan, the present situation flows from an unre-
solved civil war within a nation, in which until recently the governments of both units claimed to be the government of all of China, and ardently proclaimed their desire to see its solution. In this last instance, China was recognized by the United Nations, Taiwan is not—等特点 much more openly declare that it is an independent state. China, which suggests that some form of partition is not impossible. Recent Chinese military moves, not foreign, carried out the division of China (though the Chinese civil war was aggravated by Japanese intervention, and the maintenance of the division was energetically denied by the United States). This is not to say that China has not succeeded from China, or, legally, that China has been partitioned, though perhaps there is a de facto partition. However, this brief review of these two cases shows, contra Samba-
tans, that it is historically and analytically useful to distinguish succession and parti-
tion.

Succession's locus is in a set of all civil wars since 1944, in which it defines partition as a "war outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic change."[8] This is too broad. The reference to "border adjust-
mant" is a technical terms that sequences and partitions. A partition involves a border adjust-
mant because there must be a new, novel border, but a succession just involves a border transformation: the breakup of the prior sovereign entity converting the previ-
ously agreed (internal) border to a sovereign demarcation. Sambantas' definition also requires "demographic changes" and that the new border be the outcome of a war. It is reasonable to predict that partitions cause demographic shifts, and that both demographic and border shifts occur after wars, but these possible conse-
quen1es should not be part of the definition. It excludes the possibility of pre-
emptive partitions, motivated to prevent war.

Sambanta correctly observes that other scholars use secession and partition inter-
changeably. Political geographer do, except for some his dealing with the disinte-
gestion of the USSR (as its constituent parts as a partition. Whereas for me the breakup, division, or divorce, of an empire or state (of a confederation, or of a fed-
eration, or of a union under a common crown) among its existing内部 jurisdiction-
s may involve more than one secession, it does not constitute a partition unless there is at least one fresh cut. Taylor's approach is consistent with his definition of partition as "the division of a state into two or more territories which constitutes new states", and of secession as "the act of separating a territory from a state" (Taylor, 1995, 173, 333, 335), and political scientists generally proceed as he does.[9] So let's continue right. There is a lot of confusion of partitions and secessions, and not only among academics. Arguably that shared confusion needs to be cleaned up.

Donald Horowitz (1985) and Alexis Hercildes (1991) treat matters differently, though Sambanta thinks their views are close to his. Horowitz defines partitions as "radical surgery ... separating the antagonists" (1985: 568-70). He is, implicitly, consistent with my definition. Horowitz, however, does not stop detection between secession and partition, especially when discussing partitions. Yet his case materials treat partitions in different passages from his treatment of secessions, which is telling (1985: 588-92, 228-9). Hercildes (1991: 24), by contrast, defines partition as "the formation of two or more states by mutual consent", and a succes-
sion as "an abrupt unilateral move to independence on the part of a region that is a metropolitan territory of a sovereign independent state" that is "opposed by the Cen-
tral" (Hercildes, 1991: 1). He declares that the borderline "can often be blurred be-
tween secession, which he (wrongly) describes as unacceptable in international law, and partition, which he describes as acceptable in international law (which is true only if partitions correspond with his definition which requires consent)." Hercildes' position implies that another concept, other than partition, is required[10]

[6] Sambanta (2005: 44-6) defines his approach by stating that all partitions—wars or not discussed par-
titions as a preventative measure before they occur—add to the notion of what is necessary to consider "who is a war refrontier?" But his small district of partition does not refer whether partitions proper
[7] Some years ago I was asked by for the reasons of this distinction between those terms, taking of this discussion in a session of the United Nations "considered the possibility of creating a country-
that was the boundary of the two new sovereign states were not changed (and thus not, and sur-
expectedly, suggests that the criteria focus on the matter may be different with civil nationalist
[8] This is the concept that a partition of Croatia was sequentially related. Notoriously, Croatian elites argued with [9] Sambanta (2005: 44-6) defines his approach by stating that all partitions—wars or not discussed par-
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imposed divisions in the formation of the borders of new states or territories, be- cause his opposition makes all partitions consensual.

Herzog’s is right that a secession can also be accompanied by a partition, but he is wrong, I think, in the example that he gives, namely Norway’s peaceful secession from Sweden (discussed by Young, 1994, and see Lindgren 1959). The Swedes did not regard Norway’s departure within its existing home rule borders under the then common crown as a partition of Sweden, a conviction obviously shared by the uniting Norwegians, a view 184 of whom voted against the formation of an independent kingdom. The useful element in Herzog’s definition of a secession is its inso-

tance that the act of leaving the metropolis that is the metropolis in Latin is a way of saying that secession is the act of a territorial entity that has equal status with the rest of the empire, which is a colony engages in liberation when it exits an empire, a thought to which I shall return. But, pace Herzog, secessions and part-
titions are distinct, even if both can occur during the same conjuncture. It is consis-
tent to claim that Ireland was partitioned in 1920, and that Ireland seceded from the UK in 1921, and that Northern Ireland seceded from the Irish Free State under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. It is not for and in fine what happened.

Chaim Kaufman (1999) distinguishes partitions from secessions, but in a curious manner. He defines secessions as unilateral breaks from a state, whereas partitions are either jointly decided or imposed. This is a fairly clear distinction, but he fore-
closes the possibility that a secession can be agreed. Do Norway’s departure from Sweden, Singapore’s departures from Malaysia, and Slovakia’s departure from Czechoslovakia become partitions because there was an agreement at elite level? These three cases are usually and better understood as peaceful secessions (though some argue that Malaysia expelled Singapore from its federation; see the discussion in Young, 1994). In the Czech case a double secession occurred from the previously shared federation (Limes, 2001). Perhaps Kaufman is too much in-

fluenced by the US historical experience in which attempted secessions were very bloody.

In defence of the fresh cut distinction

The insistence that a “fresh cut” is an essential component in a political “partition” has an empirical rationale: it defines the notion precisely, differentiates it from adja-
cent phenomena, and explains better the responses to “partition”. One frequent ob-
jection to my sales, deliberately or otherwise, norma-
tive argument in favour of secessionists. The latter have their unity, which makes their entrepreneurship easier, and perhaps more painless. But, it may be said, what about groups that do not have recognized units? Some groups may not have had recent authorized self-government of any kind in administrative units that roughly approxi-
mate their homelands. Usually this will be because they have been historically those, and perhaps more generally the political division of many in the world.

This example aids the clarification of terms. Kurdish nationalists are unable to se-
cede from Iraq (or Turkey, or Syria or Iran) before they establish a Kurdish unit,

There is now a Kurdish Region in Iraq and a Kurdish Province in Iran, which makes secession possible. A Kurdistan in Turkey or Syria would have to be estab-
lished—through a liberation struggle or a political agreement—before a secession could be even entertained. Only a positive equal with a recognized territory se-
ceded; by contrast, an unequal struggles for liberation. Secessions have territo-
rial, liberalist, by contrast, must establish their territory. They may base such claims on earlier historic origins, in which case their movement will resemble a secession. This distinction between secessionists and Liberalists implies no bias and conforms to much political language. But what if the “liberators” take territory in which others’ nations are resident? Does that involve a partition? Yes, subjec-
tively, if those nations are living in what they consider as their national terri-

ory, within already formally established boundaries, they will argue that others’ na-
tional liberation will see them through the partition of their homeland.

So, in short, party may accompany both secession and national liberation, but is conceptually separate. Partition should be distinguished both from secession, and from the recognition of a secession by a political centre. This is partly a matter of authority. Empires or states (or provinces in federations) execute partitions. Secess-
ion, by contrast, is an action of regions, or provinces, or member-states of a fed-
eration or union state that may, reluctantly, be accepted by a political centre (states only have a presumptive right of secession within confederations). By contrast, part-
tition is something states do, that they can execute on a seceding region, against a national liberation movement, or in the course of “down-sizing”. The latter is also executed by a political centre. It is the quelling of a territory. It down sizing leaves prior provincial borders untouched there is no partition. It is decolonization (if there is an organized transfer of authority), or secession (if there is not). To sum up, partitions are not the same phenomena as secessions, national liber-
tion, or down sizing (whether decolonization or derealization), although they may ac-
company each of these phenomena. Partition therefore merits separate description, evaluation, and explanation, as well as assessment of its likely interaction with these adjacent phenomena. This definitional approach captures the commonensi-
cial content of what is at stake in a partition (at least in English), but it does not pret-
end to settle evaluative argument—usually meritorious in a definition. Evaluation must depend on who is doing the partitioning, for what purposes, and with what likely consequences. The merits of any definition lie in its explanatory usefulness. The claim here is that distinguishing a delimited class of partitions from the broader category of territorial divisions illuminates analysis, explanation, and prescription. This paper focuses on analysis and explanation; another focuses on prescription (OLeary, 2006).

11 For welcoming and strategies designed to accommodate and to manage international differences see O’Leary, 2001, and McIlgear and O’Leary, 1993.

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CLASSIFYING PARTITION

For those in agreement with this analysis so far, political partitions share an essence: They are fresh border cuts across a national homeland. They are intended to regulate or resolve national, ethnic or communal conflicts. But they may be distinguished in four ways:

• by whether they partition national or multinational polities,
• by whether they are external or internal;
• by the agents promoting, supporting and implementing them; and
• by the prior political status of the partitioned entities.

National versus multinational partitions

National partitions divide relatively homogeneous nations in their homelands. Unambiguous examples are the partitions of Germany, Korea and Vietnam at the onset of the cold war. More debatable examples include the partition of Mongolia, Kurdistan and Armenia—where prior unity is grounded in heretical and rival collective memories. Another is the division of China and Taiwan—debatable because of the sharp cultural differences between the cultures of historic Formosa and the settlers from the losers of the Chinese civil war. National partitions are generally caused by civil wars accompanied by large-scale interstate wars or cold wars or foreign interventions that stabilize the lines of control of the respective regimes. 13 These partitions give rise to "schizophrenic" entities, both of which claim to be the true embodiment of the nation, and seek its reunification in their image. National partitions are regarded on both sides of the partition line as abominations, artificial and unsustainable. In Germany, the capitalist liberal democratic west eventually prevailed; in Vietnam the communist north. National partitions are initially characterized by mutual non-recognition of the respective regimes, though this may give way to rapprochement and coexistence. One entity at least will initially try to fortify and close the border(s), and to subvert the opposing regime, though again this may give way to more open cross-border arrangements. National partitions are negotiated if the partition was initially deeply ideological, as it was between the two Vietnam, Korea, and the GDR and the GDRs, where the ideologies remain relentless in their respective jurisdictions, and if their continuing division is strongly supported by great or neighbourly powers. The USA formally blocked the military unification of Korea in the 1950s and of Vietnam before 1975, and the USSR vetoed the reunification of Germany until the Gorbachev era. 14 Full democratization leads to reunification movements to reverse national partitions, unless separation has endured so long

13 These arguments follow Gregory Henderson and Neil Lebow (1974: 401 at seq), who distinguish 'divided nation' (Germany, Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia) from 'partitioned commonwealth' (Ireland, India, Rwanda-Burundi, and Palestine). I have changed their existing for terminological consistency, and to emphasize that both states of affairs involve partition of nationalities, or the relevant group of nations, who invoked fresh cuts across nationalities for at least one parliament or government. I have also extended the analysis to partitions of subnational regions, and regions within regions. Finally, I have extended the analysis to multinational states where no single culture is dominant, or where competing cultures carve and re-cut national homelands.

14 This argument also follows the analysis of "schizophrenic entities" in Frank Dougherty (1967: 250-251), who argues that nations may be split into "forerunners" and "recurrents," with a recurrent element still dwelling in the shadow of a fort, which was rejected subject by Adenauer and the USA.

that two nations have emerged [as many analysts wrongly assumed about Germany].

Multinational partitions divide ethnically, religiously, communally or nationally heterogenous polities. 15 The partitions of empires, such as the partitions of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires after the first world war, are exemplary cases where the new divisions cut across homeland boundaries. The deliberate breakup of national or ethnic units within a federal or union state on this understanding is a national partition for each nationality that is divided. It may be a plural national partition overall if the maintenance of heterogeneity within units is the political goal—as was often the case in the drawing of the boundaries of former republics and the jurisdictions beneath them, and as has been true of the military redesigns of Nigeria's federation after the military defeat of Biafra's secession. By contrast, re-designing plural federal regions to form internal political borders that correspond with auto-racial homelands or linguistic units are "restorative" border architectures, rather than entirely fresh cuts, especially when executed with consensus. They should certainly not be coded as national partitions.

Internal versus external partitions

Internal partitions are driven by three strategic goals: control integration and autonomy. Internal partition for control involves the deliberate use of hierarchal management strategies, to organize one or more ethnolinguistic groups, and to disorganize and dominate others. Gerrymandering and provincial fragmentation deliberately dilute the local political concentration of the dominated ethnic/confessional group(s). Internal partition for integration, by contrast, is the territorial carving out of heterogenous units of government out of more homogeneous entities, with the intention—through mixing—of diminishing conflicts between national, ethnic or religious communities. This will normally be coded by its opponents as a form of control rather than as integration. Lastly an internal partition may be organized to promote the autonomy of a particular group that has no previously recognized jurisdiction—which is one interpretation of the formation of Northern Ireland out of historic Ulster; such internal partitions need to lead to change in the existing sovereign border of the state (empire or federation or union state) in question. 16 In the case of the parti-
tion of Ireland one of the aims of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was to keep both Irish nationalists and Ulster Unionists within the Union by granting autonomy ("home rule") to both of them. External partitions, by contrast, necessarily involve both the modification of prior homeland jurisdictions, and the attempted or actual transformation of the status of the existing sovereign border. The partition of Hungary is a good example. So are the partitions of India and Cyprus.

Inside versus outside agents of partition

The agents of partition may be distinguished by whether they are "outsiders" or "insiders. Outsiders include colonizers or leagues or alliances engaged in temporary occupations. Sovereign insiders include central governments and local collaborators. Partitions may occur through interactions between outsiders and insiders. It might seem that by our definition an external partition cannot be proposed or executed by insiders alone, that is by those within the territory that is to be partitioned. That is not right. A national liberation movement, fighting to be free from an empire, may have to carve out its own self-proclaimed national territory, for which it will seek recognition, but might in the process engage in one or more partitions if its liberation struggle leads to fresh jurisdictional cuts across the credible established homelands or other national communities. In this case, the partitionist is, of course, intent on building a state, that is to become an "insider. Partitionists of nations are often outsiders, who want these nations divided for military reasons.

The cases of national partition that flow from internal civil wars is clear that in invaders would fight their own war until the war until reunification occurred, or that they would gravely lay off their reunification. A national partition all insiders, at war, initially regard the partition as temporary. So, unless there is a military stalemate, without outsiders such partitions will not endure. By contrast, the partitionists of multinational, plurinational, plurilingual and communitarian units usually include both outsiders and insiders. Outsiders believe, or at least argue, that partition will eliminate (or at least reduce) ethnonational or other identity-based political differences; and they will be supported by at least some insiders who argue the same case. For them, partitions are proposed as long run resolutions of conflict.

ally realize national homelands with political jurisdictions, then this is an authoritarian partition or federation-building (not to be understood as a restoration of Sinhaleses, rather than as a Sinhalese act). Political geographers, for example, Skidmore 1987, 152, tend to label all internal re-divisions as partitions. "Invasion by partition as an "invasion by which a single unit on a map is divided into two or more parts," (Skidmore, 1987: 151); and political redivision of a territory into autonomous but not necessarily independent political jurisdictions, with or without the migration of the peoples resident there, in order to establish two governments (Wintner, 1982: 345). Political definitions are inherent, but does not distinguish "political partition" from "internal partition" as in the latter the boundaries have been changed, the former not. Consider the current case in Chechnya, for example, in 1986-1996, the Chechens, of course, lost their autonomy in the Russian Federation, but had a significant degree of autonomy. Political partition is demonstrated by the fact that they were recognized as a separate political unit with their own legislature and national flag.

Political status of partitions

Lastly, we may distinguish the political status of the entities that are partitioned. Here we may distinguish the status of the territories and of their peoples. In external partitions the territories may be empires or states that have lost wars. In internal partitions, they may be the provinces of union states or federations—entities with equal legal status to other provinces. They may, "however, within empires, be colonies, that is conquered entities held under direct or indirect rule by an empire, and not of equal status to provinces in the imperial core. The peoples in partitioned territories may be citizens or colonial subjects (including migrant workers). They may also be nomads or hunter-gatherers, who are not recog- nized as having any national consciousness, as with the victims of many of the colonial partitions of Africa.

The focus hereafter is on multinational partitions, executed by combinations of ins- iders and outsiders, that are really result in new international borders, and which cut across historic homeland jurisdictions within union states or federations, and which divide citizens and subjects.

An important consequence flows from this approach and discussions of types. In the twentieth century there were much fewer partitions than imagined by some, cer- tainly fewer than the number of secessions, and the numbers of decolonizations. Executed partitions are much fewer than the number of proposed partitions. This makes the analysis of partitionist cases easier from the perspective of learning the relevant histories, and massing the particular and familiar explanations of specific partitions. Sambians identify 125 civil wars since 1944, of which he classifies 21 as accompanied by partitions (by his definition). By my definition, four of these can definitely be coded as multinational partitions: Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-94);

- Cyprus (1974);
- India (1947-48, including the partition of India, Beng- gal, Punjab, and of Kashmir in 1948); and
- Palestine (1947-49). The former Yugo- slav state of Bosnia Herzegovina is a debatable case (lose, 2002). Its external bor- der within which it seceded from Yugoslavia was restored intact, but internally one of the two entities recognized, namely Republika Srpska, was the result of expulsions and partition, and in consequence so was its partner the Federation of Bos- nia-Herzegovina. The partition of India may, however, be coded as four separate partitions (of Punjab, of Bengal, and of Kashmir, as well as the partitioning of India from the two parts of Pakistan). However we resolve these cases we are left with a

- Although century sovereignty boundary changes must be investigated to confirm the truth of this pos- ition.
- The conflict (1968-94) was a contested succession, within an existing administrative unit, involving regio- nal secessionist attempts by Athens and Ankarana, but it became a crisis for internationally unrecognised partition because Armenia cut a fresh border across Azerbaijan to the Karabakh to Armenia.
- Sambians counts the 1963 Cypriot communal conflict, which led to internal expropriations and armistice, as a partition. I do not, because no fresh sovereignty was indeed unrecognised borders created.
- The unrecognised line of control in Kashmir is a de facto partition of the Kashmiri national homelands.
EXPLAINING PARTITION

The historical dimension

Several explanations of partition exist at a general level. One is an attempt at understanding partition as a phenomenon that emerged from certain conditions. Understanding partition in this way involves examining the factors that led to its occurrence. A partial and critical analysis of the process of partition is described here.

The process of partition in the context of the Indian subcontinent

Partition is the term used to describe the division of a country into two or more countries. In the case of partition, the country was divided into two or more states, each with its own government. Partition is a term that is often used to describe the division of India and Pakistan in 1947.

The role of Indian politicians

Indian politicians played a significant role in the process of partition. The partition of India and Pakistan was a consequence of the political and social conditions prevailing in the subcontinent at the time. Indian politicians, including Jawaharlal Nehru, had a significant role in the partition of India and Pakistan. Nehru played a key role in negotiating the terms of partition with the British government.

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and two irreconcilable religions" arguments in Ireland, Palestine, and India. They had a prior history of divide and rule in all these territories. When one removes "rule" from the formulae, one is left with "divide." The British had a prior history of supporting—through our allies, Ulster Unionists, Zionist Jews, Inland Muslims, Turkish Cypriots—against the emergent national majority. When one counts to "life and quit," as Pandurang Mehta (2002: 1931) famously charged was true of India, and was true of Palestine, but not Ireland.

The precedent set by Ireland—and the frontier adjustments of the League of Na-tions—encouraged some imperial elites to think of partition as a viable strategy in Palestine and India. Precisely because Ireland's partition was not as immediately literally bloody as it succeeded, it was widely coded until the 1960s as success-ful triumph.

But, alas, one cannot solely hold British imperialists culpable for partitionism. Other empires were "internally" partitioned when they seized colonies or merged terri-tories. Partitions have been advocated in regions that were never inside the British Empire: in the Balkans (for example in Bosnia and Kosovo); in the Caucasus (for example Chechnya); in Africa (for example Rwanda and Burundi); and in regions which have left the British Empire (for example in the postcolonial Arab and Muslim world, in conflicts where significantly, partitions in these regions have not been (fully) executed; recognized, or in some cases even at-tempted. Cyprus does not neatly fit the hypothesis of British imperial culpability: its partition occurred after decolonization, though a case might be made that the British failed to fulfill their treaty obligations when they did not stop the Turkish invasion in 1974. Palestine also does not fully fit the hypothesis. The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office were divided over the merits of partition. It was the UN, the USA and Abdullah of Transjordan, rather than the British, who provided the final external im-petus for partition. In Ireland, the demand for the exclusion of (at least part of) Ul-tedom from home rule and Irish independence came from unionists in both Britain and Ireland. It was a metropolitan as well as a colonial question. Partition was not a Lib-eral or a Labour enthusiasm; it was the Unionists in Lloyd George's coalition who drove it. Labour's leaders were not keen on the partition of Ireland (MacDonald), Palestine (Bevin), or India (Attlee, Cripps). Therefore a generic British political dis-position to partition these histories, and the British did not partition all their bi-colonial colonial territories, such as Sri Lanka, Sin-der, and Malaysia. Perhaps by then they had learned that partitions do not work, at least not as intended.

Yet, other decolonizing empires—France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and the USSR—did not partition their colonial territories on their departure. To the contrary, the Dutch, the Spanish, and the Portuguese were too embedded on exit from their colonies to imple-ment partitions; both Spain and Portugal were so weak that they left Morocco and Indonesia the opportunity to conquer "Spanish Sahara" and "East Timor." Remarkably, the Russian Federation resisted the calls of Chechen rebels and others to partition

Kazakhstan, despite the proximity of Russian and Russian-speaking settlers to the border of the federation. So far, it has not contemplated partition in response to the contested secession of Chechnya. Whether this reflects a republican, anticolonial or Soviet heritage might bear scrutiny. The United States, with the exception of its support for the formation of Israel, has not promoted partitions in its exercise of he-gemony after 1945.20 It is "un-American" to read reconservative and realist policy advocates sounding like their British predecessors when they discuss partitioning Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

The role of nationalists and their communal opponents

One reason why there may have been a higher incidence of partition under or after British rule is that the British sometimes granted meaningful responsibility and demo-cratic governance within their empire before they left. Ethnonational mobilization in Ireland occurred against a background of the widening of the franchise. Four fifths of Ireland's voters had insisted upon home rule for four decades from the 1880s. All the descendants of colonial settlers, mostly concentrated in Ulster, op-posed them, with the help of Great Britain's unformed House of Lords (O'Suily and McGarry, 2007, ch. 2). The issue at stake between them not only polarized Irish but also British politics. Even the principal cleavages between the Liberals and the newly named Unionists (Conservatives and Liberal Unionists). The refusal of auton-omy to Ireland eventually made a violent and democratic secessionist bid certain. Its materialization forced the British to downgrade, but the presence of Unionists in Lloyd George's coalition ensured support for Ulster Unionist resistance. In India national and communal mobilization occurred against a widening of the franchise; the Congres-sy party and the Muslim League were beneficiaries of increasing representative and responsible government at provincial level in India. In Palestine, Jewish settlers were internally democratically organized. In Cyprus, democratic mobilization oc-curred shortly before decolonization, and competitive pressures amongst Greek Cypriot politicians made it less likely that the 1969 accommodation with Turkish Cypriots would be maintained.

Implicit in this hypothesis is that democratization in conditions of potential plurina-tionalism encouraged party formation on the basis of existing national, ethnic or communal cleavages. Therefore making the cancellation of competing demands more difficult, and making the formation of 'a common demos' problematic. Partition simi-larly came onto the policy agenda amid emergent democratization and rapid ethnonational mobilizations that accompanied the breakdown of communist dictatorships. But though this reasoning may explain why partition reached the policy agenda, it does not explain why it was chosen or implemented, or not.

20 Its cold war support for the secessionist parliaments of Germany, Vietnam and Korea is, by contrast, a rea-son to reject.
Barring ruthless and ambitious political entrepreneurs, intent on maximizing the likelihood of their leadership status, is a favoured theme of historians and political scientists seeking to explain the drive toward partition. The top-down or 'high politics' school believes us to analyze the elites who support partition, and motives behind the conduct of policies. Partition is seen as the byproduct of a multifaceted bargaining game over power and resources, within the post-partition minority, the anti-partition majority and any imperial or other third party or parties.

The minority leaders who sought partition in Ireland, Palestine, India and Cyprus are fascinating specimens. Carson and Craig, Weizmann and Ben Guriion, Jinnah, and Denikist. None began as advocates of partition. No doubt, the same will be shown to the true of Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serb leaders of the 1990s. Carlin, the Dublin union's Northern Ireland and High independence with deep reluctance; indeed, he regarded it as a failure. Craig, by contrast, thought a six-county Northern Ireland would be a new impregnable Polo from which to resist Irish nationalism. Both men were ruthless in advocating the abandonment of their co-unionist in Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal. A secure majority, which Craig would hold until his death in 1940, was more important than securing as many unites as possible. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a Bombay Muslim, did not become an exponent of partition or of the two nation thesis until the 1960s. He had been an early, prominent and successful Congressman, and an advocate of secular politics—which he remained. His transition remains debated. Among the feared suggestions are resentment at loss of sulliance during Gandhi's ascendency; the unwinding of the Lucknow pact on separate electorates; opportunism after the electoral failure of the Muslim League in 1937; and the persuasiveness of Jinnah's arguments on two nations and the definition of Pakistan. Jinnah's past persuaded Congress and British officials that he was not a serious exponent of Pakistan, but was just bargaining on behalf of his own and Muslim interests. They saw him as a communal manipulator. They called his bluff. They found themselves in error—he was just bargaining as hard as he could to avoid a 'morth-eaten Pakistan', which is what he got. Like Carson and Craig, he eventually recommended abandoning his supporters elsewhere—in the non-Muslim majority provinces. Weizmann and Ben Guriion were prominent early Zionists, and deliver of the prospective boundaries of their Israel. They became early partisans because they thought it better to have a state than no state, and be ruthless in establishing such a state—whereas Ben Guriion's interest in 'transfus'. They had King Abdullah as their close calculating territorial collaborator and across the Jordan (Shlaim, 1998).

So, hardline leaders, solidly endorsed by their most militant and insecure followers, themselves of settler colonial origin, or regarding themselves as of formerly domi-
nant and superior origin—these are all parts of the story in these four cases. But why did such leaders succeed? In Ireland, India and Cyprus, but less so in Pales-
tine. Revisionist historiography blames the respective national leaders of the ma-
jority communities for placing other priorities ahead of national unity, or for failing to joint their interests for more inclusive nation-building. Sinn Fein's leaders (de Valera, Cumhurth and Griffiths) are held responsible for prioritizing sovereignty ahead of the integrity of the national territory. They made insufficient allowance for the identi-
ties, interests and ideals of their fellow Protestant Irishmen. They are collectively and individualized criticized for mishandling the negotiations with Lord George's coalition government. They should have, as they had planned, made Ulster rather than the Crown, the break-issue in the negotiations. Congress's high command is similarly held culpable by some historians (Jaffa, 1996). Nehru's underestimation of commu-
nalism, Patel's pandering to Hindu versions of it, and Gandhi's pervasively Hindu

discourses are taken to task—to debunk Congress's secular self-representation. Congress's leaders placed the attainment of independence and a strong central government ahead of accommodating the identities, interests and ideas repre-
sented in the Muslim League, which it underestimated. Its failure to ensure that the Congress-run provinces accommodated the League after 1937 is much empha-
sized—undominated Muslim support for an all-India state. In Cyprus, Makarios is held culpable for seeking to unwind the generous settlement reached with Turkish Cypriots, though it is recognized that he risked being outflanked by ultra-
and pro-

cenosratists (as confirmed in the coup d'etat that toppled him). Little revision-
ist literature, by contrast, criticizes Palestinian leaders for insufficiently accommo-
dating the interests of Zionists.

The balance of ethnontonal forces

These arguments are salutary reminders of the flaws of the respective nationalist leaders and movements, but they perhaps go too far in emphasizing their freedom of choice. They had constituencies, Irish and Indian independence had been long sought and blocked by British imperialism, Iran, Indian and Cypriot nationalism were all formally civic. They were not devoid of initiatives to compromise with their respective minorities. The first two showed willingness to compromise in key nego-
tiations over future institutions—on a provincial parliament for Ulster within Ireland, on a loose federation for India—and the Greek Cypriots agreed remarkably gener-
ous consociational terms for Turkish Cypriots in 1960. The respective elites cer-

tainly mattered, but what, we might ask, of their publics? What responsibilities for partitions lie with mass public sentiments and activities?

What of the view that partition is driven by irrecusable collective identity differ-

cences, emanating from long-established hatreds, inflamed by religious differences, and its corollary, that democratization, decolonization, and the prospect of a new political order, after imperial or dictatorial rule, bring such passions to the fore? It will not do simply to burn these theses as the ravings of that favoured beast of the soc-
cial science jungle, the 'primordial'. Such ridiculing is laughter at the expense of much of the non-academic sections of the human species.25 Cosmopolitans in our times insist that our identities are flexible, multiple, open, fluid, unpredictable and not driven by inherited traditions. They tend to deny that ethnontonal conflicts are ever rooted in ancient hatreds.

25 Francesco Galleri (1989, 2000) points out that while academics may be uniformly anti-primordial the same is not true of most non-academics, who generally medal more.
This is not the place for a general treatment of facile arguments, but we should not confuse necessary and sufficient conditions. It may be necessary for serious ethnonational conflict to be exacerbated that politicians, paramilitaries and others, make claims about historic maltreatment of their peoples, and vain of future insecurity. It is essential that they have some resonance, some credibility, with the target publics if they are to have any impact. Ethnonational grievances and religious communalism had prior histories in Ireland and India before democratization. Zionism, secular or otherwise, was a response to Jewish collective grievances, mostly at the hands of European wars, and magnified exponentially by the Holocaust. Cypriots were divided by local identification. It would be foolish to deny histories of international, inter-religious and cross-religious cooperation within states that subsequently become the site of purgatory. But it equally makes no sense to deny that collective identities and sentiments, and their communal expressions, in modern negative and stereotypical forms, provided fertile ground for politic mobilizations and counter-mobilizations. But they do not, whatever new we take on their rigidity or longevity, suffice to explain partitions, except, perhaps, in accounting for the motivations of the participants.

The politics of partition

Partition, ultimately, is a political decision, determined by imperial or external state parties, who believe in reconcilable differences between local parties, and who believe that the local autonomy or hemi-autonomy in a self-governing prismatic struggle, and decide to determine a final settlement in conditions of democratization and/or decolonization. They implement such partitions, during or after wars, when downwealing, or decolonizing, or, perhaps, in future, after humanitarian wars of intervention. These cases the story. Partition needs partisan agents, as well as collaborators. The agents need to be appropriately motivated.

The aftermath of the First World War, and the Second World War, weakened Britain's power in Ireland, in India, and Palestine. The second coming ascension of the USA and the doctrines of national self-determination propagated by the new American and Soviet great powers, already the maintenance of empire abroad and the desire to neurotransplant autonomy of communities—except for the imperial indebtedness. In those three states, British politicians sought a settlement in which they could protect their interests as best they could—with the British sovereignty circumscribed by Britain's defence interests, and with geopolitical considerations in India and the Middle East. In the post-second world war, the British, with a loosely managed partition in one case, in the other by handing over the decision to the United Nations, which for the first and the last time in its history to states proposed a partition. The details of which were later rendered irrelevant by war, and whose consequences still haunt the region. Turkey invaded and partitioned Cyprus to pre-empt a Greek takeover of the island, at a time when Turkey was undergoing a periodic democratization and Greece was under military dictatorships. The Greek Cypriots, a small island, and the Greek dictators gave the Turks their casus belli. But Turkey faces the task that is partisan settlement, apart from its gross unfairness, and over-indulgence of its co-ethnic, in kind, share, is not internationally recognized.
text design or of insufficient rigor and resolution. This response is unhelpful, utopia,
and unhelpful opposing partisan as a tool of international public policy-making,
and placing the burden of proof on its advocates. Of course, it cannot be known for certain in advance that there will never be any cases where
such partition truly is a better policy option than the alternatives. The standard for
missing that argument pass a necessary threshold in my view should be that parti-
tion is demonstrably the best way to prevent genocide, or its recurrence (O'Leary,
2016).
Two test questions are important in appraising partitions. One is empirical; the other
is political. The empirical question is whether they are reversible. The political question
is whether they should ever be reversed.
Partitions are certainly reversible in principle, just as annexations and conquests are
reversible. In the last century, China reversed the European imperialists' partitions
of its territory. The partitions of nations have been reversed in our times: Germany
and Vietnam have demonstrated this by consent, and by conquest and consent, re-
spectively. It is a safe bet to predict the eventual overturning of mono-national parti-
tions. Korea's unification may not be too far away, and South Korea at least is partly
prepared. By contrast, no such production can be made with regard to the reversal
of the partitions of para-national territories. Neither a Greater Hungary nor a Greater
Rumania, Soviet Maproly, or China, and, given that the very same borders are in-
versive partitions. The advent of some more or less 'Hebrew' nationalism in the
Palesinian territories, for example, and the political weakness of pan-Belarian
nationalism must be coded one of the key surprises of modern politics. In five of the
cases we have considered in some depth there remain vigorous champions at the original partition "against their presumed beneficiaries: Upper Ukrainians, Poles, Turks, and
Cyprus Turks, and, if we code Bosnia-Hercegovina as a partial partition, the same holds for Bos-
nian Serbs. The partition of historic Kurdistan has four regional agents in favour
of its continuation: Turkey, Syria, Iran, and most Arab opinion in Iraq. Reversing that
partition is not the operational goal of Kurdish nationalism's most successful political op-
Parties. Kurds wish to reverse the partition of the Kurdistan region within Iraq but for
now within a single Iraq (O'Leary, 2006). McGarry and Walsh, 2009).
Two brute factors are likely to determine the visibility of reversing a partition: demog-
raphy and geopolitics. If an orphaned minority becomes a majority in the successor
entity of its partitioned nation, then the partition reunifiable. This scenario may
materialize in Northern Ireland in this century. Its mere possibility is widely held to
explain some of the greater woes-plagued power-sharing and consociation among
Upper Ukrainians. If Cyprus access to the EU is accompanied by full free-
con-dom of movement on the island it is not likely that the Turkish Cypriot entity can be
unhealed as a result of that community (or that community of communities) can re-
ain a majority.
Likewise, if local and global power-holders change, or shift their dispositions, this
may facilitate the reversing of a partition. The United Kingdom is no longer a global
imperial power; it is also no longer a strongly unitarian unionist state at home; it is a

European power; and joint membership of the Eurocrat Union means that the UK
and Ireland find it easier to cooperate in overseeing a complex non-agreement set-
ttlement. They may one day cooperate in organizing a change in Northern Ireland's
sovereign status, as their respective constitutions require them do it if there are
majorities in favour in both units in Ireland.
Until now, in Cyprus and Israel, by contrast; the beneficiaries of partition have con-
sistently been able to follow demographic policies of immigration, or of settler-
infusion, and of rigorous control over the orphaned minorities, policies intended to
inhibit the feasibility of reversing the original partitions. In Israel's case, these poli-
cies seem viable behind the borders established after 1948, they do not seem vi-
able in all of historic Palestine; and the borders may be renegotiated, as Israel's
leaders appear willing to consider. The Turkish Cypriots are geopolitically weaker
than the Israelis, Greece and Greek Cyprus have a veto on Turkey's accession to the
EU, Turkey, to date, wants to join that Union. A cosponsored federal and consoc-
ialional reunited Cyprus is within the feasible set of options for all three states. The
UN proposed just such a settlement, but it was too generous for Turkish Cypriots to
win the assent of their Greek Cypriot counterparts; any new settlement will have to be
crafted as part of Turkey's complex accession. By contrast, Israel is not so cos-
strained, so far, by the interests of US foreign policymakers. Ireland and Cyprus are
the most likely possibilities for the full reversal of partitions of pluralistic territories,
while Palestine and India-Pakistan are the least likely; but even if reversal happens
in either Ireland or Cyprus, such changes will be accompanied by external
state sponsorship and consociational pacts to reduce existential and other threats to the
security and identity of the losers. The reversal of the status of Republika
Srpska will require both the willing and supported return of its exile minorities and
the weakening of at least the federal dimensions of the constitution of Bosna-
Hercegovina.
Analysis is one item; moral evaluation and prescription for the future are different.
In another paper I note evaluating and prescriptions are more thoroughly explored (O'Leary,
2006). Here I simply emphasize that because one should generally op-
pose partition one need not necessarily oppose all efforts to reverse partitions. The
practical feasibility of overturning a partition does not mean that it is the best po-
licial option. The reunification of Ireland and of Cyprus under a more federal and con-
sockialional formula may be in the national and collective interests of all the major-
ities of the affected peoples. By contrast, reunification in either the Middle East or
South Asia is less obviously in the interests of the affected peoples. It is possible to
argue that the partition of Palestine was wrong, and should not have happened, but
to maintain that the full reversal of that partition would create more difficulties than it
would resolve. Champions of a two-state solution to the Israeli and Palestinians con-
lict may be right to argue that a bi-national state would not work all after that has
transpired. It is also possible to argue that the partition of the Indian subcontinent
was wrong, and should not have happened, but to oppose a full political reunifica-
tion of the subcontinent and instead to favour softer forms of association, such as a
South Asian Common Market, and to encourage a settlement in Kashmir which has
the assent of its peoples.
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