Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, is strongly opposed by the nationalist minority within Northern Ireland, who make up over 50% of Northern Ireland's Catholics, and is also formally opposed by the majority of the citizens of the Republic of Ireland. They argue that the Irish people as a whole were denied their right to self-determination when the island of Ireland was divided administratively, by the treaty between Britain and Ireland in 1921. They believe that the Irish state is right to claim sovereignty over Northern Ireland in its 1937 constitution. The current Irish Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, argues that Northern Ireland has proved to be a failed political entity, and hence, that systematic sectarian discrimination and economic discrimination has been endemic since its creation. So far, Ulster unionists have never been able to persuade more than a minority of the Catholic minority that the British state is one which can treat them equally and full and equal citizens. The British themselves, whether their governments, political parties, or their people have also not regarded Northern Ireland as truly British. Despite Mrs. Thatcher's assurance at the time of the Maze hunger strikes that Northern Ireland is a part of Britain as fully as Falmouth, successive British governments, including her own, have not taken measures to integrate Northern Ireland fully into the British Commonwealth.

The third option, independence, is espoused by most actors within Northern Ireland. Unionists reject independence because it would mean that they would no longer be British, whereas nationalists reject it both because they would not part of Ireland and because they would be a minority within a new state. British and Irish policy-makers reject this option as unthinkble, primarily because they do not believe such a state could be stable. Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement allows a majority in Northern Ireland to determine whether the territory is to belong to the UK or to the Republic of Ireland, but it does not permit such a majority to opt for independence. Others argue that an independent Northern Ireland would not be economically viable because it would be too small — a fallacious argument given the existence of numerous and viable small states, such as Singapore.

The fourth option, joint sovereignty or joint authority, has been rejected by the current British government: first, because of the Thatcher government's well-known distaste for losing any iota of sovereignty; and second, because it is considered undemocratic since it would have to be imposed against the wishes of a majority of Northern Ireland's citizens. The post the current British government has been prepared to go in considering this option is embodied in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (which was imposed against the

wishes of a majority of the province's electorate. As a result the Agreement the British government undertook to consult the Irish government on all matters of public policy affecting Northern Ireland. Through the forum of a regular intergovernmental Conference, and to make 'determined efforts ... to resolve any differences between the two governments' (Article 2). Every reader of CONTEMPORARY PERIODICIS is presumably familiar with the antagonism of Ulster unionists to this very inquisitive British move in the direction of joint local authority, and with the subsequent difficulties both governments have had in managing the Agreement.

The Irish solution to Northern Ireland's statehood is to partition its territory and population between the British and Irish states, creating a smaller and more homogeneous unionist and Protestant British Ireland, and a larger Republic of Ireland which would incorporate the majority of Northern Ireland's nationalists and Catholics. This option is not publicly favored by any British, Irish or Northern Irish political party. Organizing a just and stable partition would also be very problematic given the distribution of the\n
\n
WHICH TYPE OF STATE?

There are three established constitutional modes of organizing sovereign states: unitary, federal, or confederal forms. In their turn unitary states, federations and confederations can be more or less centralized or decentralized, depending upon the structures of government, intergovernmental relations and the allocation of powers and functions.

An Irish state, even if it were to be accompanied by extensive devolution of authority to the existing region of Northern Ireland. They find it incomprehensible that it would inevitably waste sovereign power in the hands of the nationalist/Catholic majority in the island of Ireland. The fact that since 1982 it has seen no objective of Sinn Fein and the IRA to obtain a unitary Irish state does nothing to enhance this option's attractiveness to Ulster Protestants.

An Irish federation or confederation would either have to be a two-unit federation or confederation, or a single two-unit entity. It is the historical track-record of such federalistic institutions in bi-national societies is disastrous. They have proven consistently unstable elsewhere in the world. The problem with any more than two-unit entity is that it would require very severe disruption of the Irish state. If it were to be divided, the Irish government and the regime in Dublin would be split between the two, and the resulting division would be likely to have severe implications for the Irish state and the world. The problem with any more than two-unit entity is that it would require very severe disruption of the Irish state.

The United Kingdom is presently a unitary state. Northern Ireland used to have a devolved government within the UK's decentralized unitary state; the Northern Ireland government which presides over institutionalized discrimination against Catholics and rationalism. However, since 1972 Northern Ireland has been centrally governed, under direct rule from Westminster and the Northern Ireland Office.

The future of Northern Ireland is uncertain. If the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were to dissolve, the future of Northern Ireland would be uncertain. It is possible that a new arrangement could be established, perhaps through a new Act of Union, or through a new constitutional convention. However, this is unlikely given the complex political and social issues involved.

The current situation in Northern Ireland is complex and fraught with difficulties. The future of the region is uncertain, and it is likely that any new arrangement will be subject to ongoing negotiation and compromise.
refusal of unionists to advance devolu-
tional proposals which might win nationalist consent. 2 Historically informed pecuniary reasons therefore have good reasons to suppose that the current mood of 'talks about talks' about devolution, orchestrated by the new Secretary of State Peter Brooke, are likely to go the way of their predecessors, 3 and when, all the invited parties agree to share the same conference venue they are unlikely to be speaking the same language.

The United Kingdom has never formally been a federation or a confederation. However, even if it were to become more like a federation or a confederation, let us say after the establishment of Scottish and Welsh devolution as well as powerful English regions by a radical reforming Labour government, it is not clear what significance this constitutional transformation of the UK state would have for solving the problems of Northern Ireland. Ulster unionists would presumably seek a UK federation or confederation as failing to meet their aspirations for an Irish dimension, and would fear that it might become a vehicle for the re-establishment of something resembling the Stormont regime.

What about a federation or confederation of the British Isles? What are the alternatives we would want to suggest? Would not such an institutional transformation satisfy the dual national aspirations of the peoples in Northern Ireland? Perhaps, but the British and Irish states are unlikely to surrender sovereignty over all their territories to solve the Northern Ireland question if they currently find it so difficult to manage their conflicting sovereignty claims over the province. Moreover, Irish nationalists, both North and South, would see any proposal for a federated or confederated British Isles - a Trojan horse for the re-incorporation of Ireland under British control, and for that reason alone such an idea would be rejected out of hand.

What is the idea of Northern Ireland's problems will be transcended within the framework of an emergent European federalization or confederation? Is that joint membership of the European Community already underway the development of good relations between the London and Dublin governments but is it not obvious what impact survivors from increasing European union will have on intra-communal relations within Northern Ireland. Key issues surrounding dual national identity, the administration of hostilities, military economic, political, and cultural violence, discrimination and the distribution of local political power are unlikely to be resolved by products of the repercussions of 1992. The removal of tariff barriers and increased economic

Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

cross-border cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, if it materializes, will not resolve a conflict centered on nationality and ethnicity. Moreover, the border across Ireland is likely to remain one of the most heavily policed in the European Community whatever the fate of the 1992 project. European cooperation is something desirable in its own right, not something to be favoured because it will be a panacea for Northern Ireland.

Unitary, federal or confederal formulae for a Northern Ireland which stays in the UK, or becomes part of an all-Ireland state, do not appear to advance the search for a solution, at least upon cursory inspection. The same argument holds true for an independent Northern Ireland of a "Northern Ireland" governed under joint authority. In part the reason why these formulae are unhelpful is that they are insensitive about the nature of their implications for political decision-making.

REFERENCES

(1) Such opinions are especially common in non-attributable interviews with British policy-makers.


Brendan O'Leary is Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Public Administration at the IOMC. He is currently engaged on research into the Anglo-Irish Agreement, supported by the Irish Fiscal Council.

Brendan O'Leary is Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Public Administration at the IOMC. He is currently engaged on research into the Anglo-Irish Agreement, supported by the Irish Fiscal Council.
REAL EVILS

"Tea professionals" - especially those working for the British media - are inclined to see the Irish peace process as blaming the messenger for the bad news. Perhaps Hugh Young should not blame his fellow journalists for the evils of contemporary media.

Certainly some of the less attractive characteristics of our political system are reflected in the Irish media. In the 1980s, bi-polar political and economic partisanship were reflected in the press. The partial dismantling of local government has been accompanied by the virtual elimination of a regional element in the national and local press. Among the many controversies carried by the press is a message about educational levels in a nation whose most popular reading materials are The Sun and the Daily Mirror. Are we equipped to face the 1990s decade, gone the next century?

SELECTED READING


Jerome Tunnall is director of communications policy research centre at City University, London.

SOLVING NORTHERN IRELAND?

Brendan O'Leary

Brendan O'Leary concludes his penetrating analysis of the political options facing Northern Ireland.

WHAT TYPE OF DECISION-MAKING?

The key question for Northern Ireland, whichever state it belongs to, is to what extent its constitutional position matters. Is it straightforward: how should political and policy-making power be organised across and within the respective communities? There are basically two ideal types of approach which this question might be answered: abrogation, majority-rule, power-sharing and accommodation. Each of these types could be pursued in multiple ways, but how far have we come to expand upon this theme?

Arbitration

First, an external power might be given the role of arbiter in Northern Ireland, refereeing conflicts and adjudicating disputes in the absence of consensus. This role has been exercised by British governments since 1972. After the Anglo-Irish agreement it has been exercised in consultation with the Irish government, providing 'diverted role' with a green light. In principle, at some future juncture, arbitration might be exercised by both Britain and Ireland in a system of joint authority. More fancifully, arbitration might be exercised by the European Community (direct role from Brussels) or by the United Nations.

The most fundamental problem with arbitration is that the arbitral process do not regard the most likely arbiters, namely Britain and Ireland, as sufficiently interested or neutral. To particular Irish nationalists, with considerable justification, regard direct British rule in Ireland as responsible for continuing economic discrimination and regular abuses of human rights by the security forces. Unionists, by contrast, find repulsively the mere idea of institutionalised confrontation with the Irish Republic by the British government.

Majority-rule

Second, political power might be exercised according to majority-rule principles. This fundamental norm of the Westminster model is, however, problematic in ethnically divided societies. Under the Stormont government there was one party rule by the Unionist Unionist Party for over 50 years, and there was no prospect of the nationalist opposition achieving governmental authority. The system of majority-rule deviation provided a perfect milieu for the systematic abuse of political power. Majority rule has not made procedures attached to majority, federal or confederal formulas would create the same barrier, whether Northern Ireland was Irish, Irish, jointly governed or independent.

In any case the question might well be asked: which majority? Irish nationalists claim that Northern Ireland is illegitimate because its borders were drawn so as to create an artificial majority, and that they are the greatest majority in the island of Ireland. Assessing the Irish nationalist claim, they are, in a majority within Northern Ireland and should be allowed to exercise political power commensurate with their status.

Brendan O'Leary, by contrast, argues that the core majority in the United Kingdom is needed. He contends that...
'real' British political parties, viz. the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, were to organise and compete in elections in Northern Ireland then its ethically-based politics would be transformed.6" The argument, currently very fashionable amongst the Young Conservatives, rests on three very fictitious foundations. Firstly, it presupposes that Northern Irish voters will vote for British political parties in large numbers if they are given the opportunity. The evidence to date is not persuasive. The Conservative, the solitary British political party to have organised in the province, have lost deposits in both the European Parliamentary election 1989 and the by-election in Upper Bann in May 1990, and have performed adequately in only one very unrepresentative local government election in North Down. Groups seeking to persuade the Labour Party to stand in the province have received dispiriting responses. Secondly, the argument rests on the assumption that Northern Irish voters who will vote for British political parties will do so for non-religious reasons. However, polling evidence suggests that the Conservatives would appeal more to those in favour of the Union, i.e. Protestants, whereas the Labour Party would appeal more to those in favour of Irish unity, i.e. Catholics, because Labour favours achieving Irish unity by consent.7 For those transcending sectarian politics the organised mass of British political parties in the province would directly embed them in the national and religious conflicts, just as they were deeply affected by them before 1920. Third, the argument erroneously assumes that the major cause of national, ethnic and religious conflict in Northern Ireland since 1920 has been the absence of political parties in the province. These electoral integrationist arguments, favouring majority rule in the United Kingdom as in one, are as wildly idealist about the benefits of the Westminster model as Gaelic romantics are about Irish unification. In the British Isles political religious nationalism is not an exclusively Irish commodity.

Power-Sharing

However, political relationships in Northern Ireland might be organised according to a third principle, power-sharing. Known as consociational to political scientists, power-sharing is characteristic of democratic and stable societies which are nonetheless deeply divided by ethnic or religious cleavages.8 Consociational democracies usually have four key features. First, a grand coalition government incorporates the political parties properted to the divided society. Second, proportionality rules throughout the public sector; the proportional representation of each segment in key political institutions (the electoral system, executive, legislature, judiciary, and the bureaucracy) is matched by the proportional allocation of public expenditure to each segment. Third, devolved government permits each group self-government over those matters of its profound concern to them: for example, each group may be proportionally and equally funded to support and run its own educational system. Finally, consociational systems entrench the right of constitutional veto for minorities. In effect successive British governments since 1972 have been trying to promote a consociational solution to Northern Ireland's problems, seeking to persuade constitutional political parties to share political power in a devolved government. Under Article 4 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement both the British and Irish governments have been consulted to this solution since 1985, and Mr Brookes has been actively seeking to implement it in recent months.

Consociational solutions, which together with many others I believe to be the most desirable for divided societies like Northern Ireland, failed to work before 1985 for clear reasons - although British governments took a long time to learn them. First, consociational solutions can work only where the rival segments are fundamentally divided over their national as opposed to their ethnic or religious identities. Nationalities appear to have an irreducibly zero-sum character, a view which is mightily reinforced by murderous paramilitaries who aim to make everybody believe the proposition that 'one nation = one state'. Second, the majority of constitutional nationalists rejected any consociational proposals if they were not accompanied by an institutionalised Irish dimension. Finally, political leaders of nationalist and unionist parties who were personally prepared to compromise fundamentally on the outlines of a consociational settlement would find themselves isolated within their parties and within their ethnic communities.

Finally, since both the nationalist and unionist communities were internally divided into 'ultras' and 'moderates' the latter were insufficiently free to negotiate a consociational settlement. The SDLP had to look over its shoulder at Sinn Fein and the IRA, whereas the Official Unionists had to watch out on their extremist flank for fear of being outmanoeuvred by the Democratic Unionists and loyalist paramilitary organisations.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was meant to break this stalemate. By entrenching an Irish dimension it was intended to weaken Sinn Fein, strengthen the SDLP and make power-sharing possible by way of a consociational settlement. The Agreement has weakened Sinn Fein, but not as much as was hoped, and the SDLP have not shown themselves to be as keen to negotiate on devolution as the British government surmised. The SDLP's spokesmen have emphasised that the party has 'no ideological commitment to devolution', even if it is to be based on power-sharing. Moreover SDLP leader John Hume has consistently argued that only when unionists have 'soured out' their relationships with the rest of the people of Ireland can a general consociational accommodation between nationalists and unionists be reached. Since 1986 Hume seems to have been canvassing pan-Irish solutions to the conflict rather than advocating an internal settlement. Meanwhile the IRA has continued to create mayhem, supported by Sinn Fein, and to disrupt whatever limping prospects exist for political negotiations.

By entrenching an Irish dimension the Agreement was also intended to encourage unionists to negotiate a consociational settlement since Article 4 cleverly avoided a commitment to either a true bilingual or a homogenised society and to share power the latter governmental Conference would become less attractive to unionists and nationalists. This has been nearly unanimous in entirely rejecting the Agreement, and campaigning vigorously for
but its abolition, throughout 1866-7. Enthusiasts for power sharing within their ranks remained isolated, while the majority insisted that they would only negotiate with nationalists if the Agreement was removed, or at least suspended. Staton observers believe that the strategy of key unionist leaders remains that of destroying the Agreement rather than negotiating a consensual settlement with an Irish dimension. These unionist leaders, remain hopeful that one of a number of scenarios (a change of British policy, a large parliament at Westminster, or a catastrophic deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations) will be at play for the objective of breaking the Agreement. James Mallyon, the leader of the Orange Unionsists, is known to be hostile to deviation in principle (and to favour Northern Ireland's complete integration into the United Kingdom, which is why his current involvement in talks with Mr. Brooke has provoked scepticism among journalists and analysts of Irish politics.

However, it is very clear that both the British and the Irish government remain firmly committed to the Agreement, as they declared in their Official Review of the Agreement in May 1985—which carried the Agreement in 2002 in the same Dublin official put it to me. Only a broader agreement which unionists negotiate and accept could produce change in London and Dublin on the text of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Therefore, those of a view that Mr. Brooke's current talk to establish a devolutionary consensual settlement cannot succeed, as he speaks. In order to get rid of the agreement unionists must offer nationalists a new agreement which reverses the previous one, a new agreement in which the Irish dimension is at least as significant as the present one, as all as offering nationalists a power-sharing devolutionary settlement within Northern Ireland. If they are prepared to do that, and offer it in the United package of both the principal unionist parties, then Mr. Brooke will clearly win the Nobel peace prize nomination in 1991, and along with many others I will have to eat hundreds throughout the next year.

The constitutional parties in Northern Ireland, the British and Irish governing parties, are best seen as engaged in a complex war of manoeuvre in which each agent's prime objective is to ensure that they are not held responsible for the breakdown of talks about talks. Therefore consensual solutions, while uncontentious, desirable, seem destined to fall on already ground in Northern Ireland for the foreseeable future.

There are several ways in which the British and Ireland, with their devolutionary prime ministers, can play their game safely: if they recognise the increasingly palpable fact. They must work out a strategy in cross-management. Alternatively they may agree to play a long-term strategy, reforming Northern Ireland's discriminatory economy and its administration of justice to win the political confidence of nationalists, isolating the IRA and Sinn Fein, while simultaneously early coaxing unionists in from the cold.

The logic of this strategy would be to accomplish all of the institutional features of consensualism except grant coalition government — which would have to await until a later date, in other words the two governments would aim to ensure proportional representation in non-elected political institutions (including, eventually, the police), segmental autonomy, and a larger of rights guaranteeing equality of citizenship and citizenship some minority rights, et cetera.

The British and Irish governments might also take the more risky and strategic step of threatening a major new initiative, such as moving towards joint authority or repartition, in order to increase the pressure on unionists and nationalists to arrive at a consensual settlement. Avard Lipps, the pioneer of the theory of consensualism, argues that partition is the most stable and least undesirable solution when consensualism fails, and that threatening partition might sometimes bring the relevant actors to the negotiating table. In the concluding chapter of one forthcoming book, The Future of Northern Ireland, 20th McGarr and T (which is a similar argument for Northern Ireland).

Cantonisation

However, there is one final way in which political power might be distributed in Northern Ireland which permits partition, majority rule and consensual logic in a distinctive synthesis which is worthy of consideration. Northern Ireland could be constantly, in a manner similar to the Sin BW mode of government, that is to say political power could be extensively devolved to new and very small political units, averaging about 20,000 people, although some counties are much larger. Such political units could be designed either to achieve a very local form of consensualism, grand coalition governments of Catholics and Protestants, in certain cases, or, given the scale of residential segregation in recent years, to create religiously and ethnically homogeneous units where majority rule would be practically coherent with self-government of all the relevant community. Where international conflict is high they the partitioning of units would create homogeneous units and the second principle, and whose conflict was low, local consensualism might be encouraged through the concept of balanced mixed cantons.

This strategy would decouple Northern Ireland from its island of nationalist, unionist, and consensualist cantons; simultaneously combining majority rule, partition and consensualist principles. Some areas with high political violence would have to remain under direct rule, and a governance-wide anti-terrorist force would obviously still be required. However, under a schema of 'cantonisation', so to speak, policing and judicial powers could be gradually devolved to more areas where the population expressed a wish to exercise such powers, and where the British and Irish governments judged that the experiments had some prospects of success.

Nevertheless, this cantonisation idea is fraught with potential difficulties, notably the difficulties in drawing and policing appropriate units of government, winning consent for them, and the ever-onerous threat that cantonisation, especially of policing and judicial powers, might be used by paramilitary organisations to seize control of parts of North Ireland, and treat them as 'liberated areas'. However, advocating cantonisation is at least realistic in prefiguring for a consensual settlement, posing traditional unionist or nationalist positions, or commending joint authority. Cantonisation is also more gradualist in its implications than drastic repartition because it permits both governments to 'proceed to the experiment. For these reasons it deserves to be debated more widely - although this remark should not be construed as an uncritical endorsement of the merits of cantonisation.

CONCLUSION

This very brief round-up of some of the solutions envisaged for Northern Ireland's more complex political problem, which is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive. For fuller arguments John Wolfe's Interpretion, Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon) and the collected and diverse essays in McGarr and O'Leary's Complex夹合 (The Future of Northern Ireland should prove useful. Moreover, this untie has paid little attention to the meaningfulness of empathy in public policy affecting security, justice and employment in Northern Ireland. Nonetheless it is permissible readers that there are more solutions to Northern Ireland problems than is thought, and that some of these solutions are worthy of greater thought of the kind, if full justice is achieved in central government.

If there is no solution then there is no problem, or a well-known managerial maxim. Would you happen apply it to Northern Ireland? This question is plainly rhetorical. However, you have said that it is false to say that there is no solution.
REFERENCES

1 The phrase is Paul Biew and Henry Patterson's; see 'Chapter 8: Scenarios for progress in Northern Ireland' in McGarry, P. and O'Leary, R. (eds) The Future of Northern Ireland.

2 'Joy of the best statements of this view can be found in A. Lipton (1984) Democracy, Yale.


5 The local unionism of the theory of sociopoliticians can be found in A. Lipton's Democracy in Penal Societies, 1987. Yale, its general difficulties, and its difficulties for Northern Ireland, are summarized in B. O'Leary, 'The limits to concordialism in Northern Ireland', Political Studies, 1989, 37, 4.


8 This light is due to the possibility of using the real policy backdoor by the British Labour Party, as articulated in its document 'Towards a United Ireland' (1995).

9 This sector briefly discusses the idea which is represented by John Bannister in Lenn Kennedy's Two Ulster.

Brendan O'Leary is Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Public Administration at LSE. He is the co-editor with John McGarry of The Future of Northern Ireland. He is the author of The Atlantic Model of Production (1989), Blackwell, and co-author (with Patrick Dunleavy) of Theories of the State (1987), Macmillian. He is currently engaged in research on the Anglo-Irish Agreement, supported by the National Foundation.

YES, INTERVIEWER!

Changing Art of the Political Interview

David Walter and John Forsyth

Recent clashes between politicians and media interviewers, and accusations of alleged bias against certain broadcasters, have again highlighted the sensitivity of the political interview. This article puts on the record an important radio programme analysing the political interview's postwar history.

The television or radio studio has challenged both Parliament and the public meeting as a focus of political life for successive generations of the disaffected. In both the hustings and the House of Commons, even since the arrival of the TV camera, the politician is — or hopes to be — in control, choosing the subject and largely setting the tone.

For most of the electorate the only opportunity they will have to hear a politician's views and grasp of his or her subject tested comes through the inter- view section of an interviewer. In June 1989 BBC Radio 4's In Focus Political focused on the evolution of the art of the political interviewer and the art of answering — or not answering — his questions. Over the years the British and Northern Irish politicians have pushed the frontiers back against the politicians. Over the last decade or more politicians have organised themselves to push the frontiers back again.

When Clinton Arbe Jew from the United States, he faced what passed in the 1950s as a grilling in front of the television camera:

INTERVIEWER: Good morning Mr Arbe.

ARBE: We have had a good journey.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, excellent.

INTERVIEWER: Can you, now you're back, having cut short your lecture tour, tell us something of how you view the election prospects?

ARBE: Oh, we shall go in and have a good fight. A very good chance of winning, we shall go in confidently, we always do.

INTERVIEWER: And on what will Labour take its stand?

ARBE: Well, that we'll be announcing shortly.

INTERVIEWER: What are your immediate plans, Mr Arbe?

ARBE: My immediate plan is to go down to a committee and decide on just the thing... as soon as I can get away from here.

INTERVIEWER: Anything else you'd like to say about the coming election?

ARBE: No.

Politicians can't get away with it like that any more — interviewers that deferential, subjects that condescending. It wasn't long after that interview with Clement Attlee that radio and television journalists decided to take the trikes off their heads and the plans out of their mouths, and make the questions a great deal tougher. The development was spurred on by the start of Independent Television News in September 1953 as a rival to the BBC. The Corporation soon found itself competing with ITV's much more robust attitude to politicians. Robin Day was in the vanguard of the revolution — first for ITN — then for the BBC.

Day there was no controversy in broadcasting at all, and those 'were when one started and asked the visiting Minister at the airport any question after that. Are you tired after your long trip?' it was seen to be a rather probing question. It wasn't for so, there were men working on the new Panorama at that time, and the style in ITN, notably George Fisher and others, we're all agreed that the right way to question politicians was to ask the relevant questions tersely and persistently, and in a careful, prepared way. Performance on the media as a test of political prowess had become very important by the early 1960s. Before