Ideology, Ideologues, and War*

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March 28, 2011

DRAFT: Please contact me for an updated version.

Abstract

What is the connection between ideology and war? This paper (part of a broader research program that is still in its infancy) examines this question, focusing in particular on arguments that differences in the manner in which leaders legitimate their rule domestically (one common definition of ideology) increase the probability of violent conflict between countries and make those conflicts that arise more difficult to bring to an end. After reviewing various meanings of “ideology” and briefly summarizing several arguments that I plan to make in the broader project, I review existing work, drawing out several hypotheses about the connection between ideology and war that merit further testing. Based on a novel dataset that contains yearly observations on the manner in which European leaders legitimated their rule in the 1816-2008 period, I conduct statistical tests of these hypotheses. The results indicate that ideological difference is closely connected to the probability of conflict, that ideology’s role is not limited to the relatively powerful states (as one reading of standard Realist critiques would seem to imply), that there is evidence of “waves” of ideological polarization in history, and that ideological difference has no clear effect on the destructiveness of war but may impede the negotiated settlement of ongoing wars.

*Paper presented at the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference.
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What is the connection between ideology and war? Are certain ideologies particularly predisposed towards violence? Is ideological difference a source of conflict? Are more ideological leaders more likely to end up fighting? Ideology is an enduring, if peripheral, feature of theories of international relations: Hans Morgenthau (1951, ch. 7), who is typically seen as the intellectual grandfather of Realism, devoted a neglected chapter of his best-known work to the subject, and after a decline in interest with the end of the Cold War, more recent constructivist work has resurrected ideology as a significant variable in international politics. Yet there remains much that we do not know about the connection between ideology and violence. On the one hand, mainstream political scientists, following the lead of Kenneth Waltz (1979), have explicitly or implicitly denigrated the significance of ideology. On the other hand, a small number of scholars have argued that ideological differences are a, or even the, driving force in international politics (Haas 2005; Owen IV 2010). The field thus lacks a clear answer to these questions.

This paper represents a first cut at answering these questions, a task that will ultimately require much more work that can only be presented in a format longer than a single article. I first summarize my vision for the broader project, clarifying the central questions, defining key terms, and advancing several broad arguments about the connection between ideology and war, most of which I am unable to test here. This section concludes with a short summary of research strategies for those parts of the project that are not examined further in this paper.

The bulk of the paper then examines a single more specific question: to what extent do differences in the way in which leaders legitimate their rule at home (one common meaning of ideology) influence interstate conflict behavior? I first review different arguments about the connection between domestic politics and international behavior, drawing out several testable hypotheses. I then summarize an ongoing data collection process on the nature of political legitimation in the standard Correlates of War universe, which thus far has collected data on Europe over the relevant period. The next section presents preliminary statistical results, starting with tests of hypotheses about conflict onset and then turning to the relationship between ideological difference and war duration and severity. This analysis reveals a consistent and robust relationship between ideological difference and the probability of conflict, suggests some evidence that ideological conflict
is self-reinforcing, and uncovers an unexpected relationship between ideological difference and the
conduct and duration of war. The final section concludes.

1 An Overview of a Broader Project

1.1 Two Definitions of Ideology

In the political realm, “ideology” has been used to refer to two apparently quite different phenomena
in international relations. Most commonly, a political ideology provides a basis for domestic political
legitimation. Thus, for example, under a liberal democratic ideology, the right to rule derives from
the consent of the governed, typically as expressed through free and fair elections. By contrast, in
monarchies, legitimate rule is determined by heredity, with a possible further justification through
divine right. Communism justifies rule through the legitimate dictatorship of the proletariat, which
implies that government serves the interest of (the mass of) the people, but is not beholden to them.
A range of alternate bases for political legitimation exists. By this definition, one might say that the
Bush administration was ideological because it had a strong belief that democracy was a superior
form of government, which given its superiority should be promoted around the world.

Second, and less commonly, ideology can refer to a theory of international politics, with an
associated set of policy prescriptions. Thus, for example, we can identify a range of different “ide-
oologies” that characterize American debates over foreign policy, such as Posen and Ross’s (1997)
list of isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy, or Mead’s (2001) char-
acterization of enduring Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian strands of American
thinking about foreign policy (which combine differences in preferences with differing understand-
ings of the way in which international politics works). By this standard, the Bush administration
might be considered ideological because it operated under a neoconservative understanding of inter-
national politics that among other things identified threats in international relations with domestic
tyrranny, deprecated the effectiveness of international institutions and international law, and advo-
cated the liberal use of force. Similarly, some of the most ideological leaders in history had clear
theories of international politics, as with Adolf Hitler’s racial theory that predicted insuperable
struggle between races for *Lebensraum*, or the theories of Soviet leaders that predicted class war and a falling out among the capitalist powers, with the inevitable spread of communism to the rest of the world.

### 1.2 Central Arguments

In the broader project, I plan to advance four broader arguments. The first follows from the two conventional definitions of ideology described above. In brief, I argue that ideology under the first definition tends to be connected to ideology under the second. In other words, the way in which a leader legitimizes her rule domestically plays a consistent and important role in determining her theories of foreign policy and international politics. Marxism-Leninism provides perhaps the most obvious example: based on a Marxist understanding that saw domestic politics as a class struggle in which a legitimate (i.e. communist) government advanced the interests of the repressed proletariat against a rapacious bourgeoisie, Lenin and subsequent communist thinkers developed a theory of international politics in which capitalist states, which had been captured by the bourgeoisie, would continually seek new markets, producing an external drive that manifested itself first as colonial expansion and eventually as great power war (Lenin 1920).

This example is particularly clear, but it is hardly unique. In the nineteenth century, monarchs justified their rule at home by arguing that enlightened monarchs were better able to advance the national interest than a capricious public, and supported their argument in part with reference to the extreme behavior of more “liberal” states, of which Revolutionary France was an obvious example. Less obviously, but more importantly, however dominant Realism may once have been in American international relations scholarship, American presidents have consistently viewed seen domestic politics as a useful indicator of the intentions and likely behavior of other states. One of the tenets of early idealism, inspired by Woodrow Wilson, was that democracy was a superior form of government; more recent presidents, from Clinton to Bush to Obama, have seen democracy as a useful indicator of how a foreign state is likely to act.

The second central argument, building on work by Haas (2005) and Owen IV (2010), is that differences in the ideology of domestic political legitimation are associated with disagreement in
international politics and hence with conflict. This argument is not novel, but existing work has not
developed the empirical data necessary to fully evaluate it. This paper focuses on this relationship.

Third, I argue that ideology as theory of foreign policy has a clear connection to international
conflict, but that that connection depends on the content of the ideology. In particular, different
theories of international relations have different implications for a country’s future. For Hitler, a
logical implication of his ideology was that Germany was headed for relative decline (a consequence
of its small size relative to the continental empires or the Soviet Union and the US or the colonial
empires of Britain and France, which implied eventual limits to the size of the German population).
When combined with his conviction that racial differences could not be bridged, this expectation of
decline provided a powerful stimulus for a risky policy of territorial expansion (Weisiger 2010, ch. 6).
By contrast, a logical implication of Marxism-Leninism was that the world was headed inexorably
towards communism, as the internal contradictions of capitalism became ever more severe. As such,
Soviet leaders believed that they could win by not losing: as long as communism survived where
it existed, its eventual triumph was inevitable. This belief that time favored socialism—which
contrasts strongly to Hitler’s belief that time favored Germany’s opponents—meant that Soviet
leaders could afford to be far more cautious about the use of force.

Finally, I expect that ideologically committed leaders (here using the second definition of ide-
ology) will differ from less ideologically committed leaders. As a theory of international politics,
an ideology is useful because it provides clear prescriptions about appropriate policy even in am-
biguous situations—to cite one example, George Bush turned to neoconservativism after 9/11 in
large part because the neoconservatives in his administration were able to propose a specific policy
response that they were able to ground in a plausible (if flawed, especially in retrospect) theory
of how international politics works. The downside to ideology is that all theories are sometimes
wrong, and deeply believed, relatively uncomplicated theories will at times be spectacularly wrong,
especially when dealing with something as complicated as international relations.\(^1\) This point has
several implications. For one, more ideological leaders are more likely to have high confidence in

\(^1\) On the point that all theories are wrong, see Waltz (1979, ch. 1), who argues that to be useful theories must
simplify the world, abstracting away from some aspects of reality that are deemed less significant for the question at
hand. The more that theory strips from reality, the clearer its implications, but also the greater the danger that
aspects of reality that theory ignores turn out to be significant.
inaccurate predictions about international politics. To the extent that these predictions concern the use of force, they may result in the leader being unduly optimistic and hence more likely to end up at war.\textsuperscript{2} Separately, confidence in ideology as theory of international politics may provide confidence in the effectiveness of dramatic policy revisions; by contrast, less ideological leaders, lacking such clear arguments about the preferability of alternative policy options, will be less likely to deviate from the status quo dramatically. As a result, I expect that foreign policy will in effect exhibit greater variance under more ideological leaders.

2 Ideological Difference and International Conflict

The remainder of this paper focuses on just one aspect of the relationship between ideology and international conflict, namely the role of differences in domestic legitimating ideology across countries. This sort of ideological difference was of course one of the most salient features of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. With Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) synthesis of Realist theory, however, mainstream political science came to downplay the role of ideological difference in favor of the dictates of power and of the international system: while states might prefer to see their ideology (however defined) spread throughout the world, the strictures imposed by international anarchy and the possibility that today’s friend might become tomorrow’s enemy militate against following one’s ideological predispositions. From this perspective, the Cold War was an inevitable consequence of the distribution of power in the international system, and would have arisen whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union structured their internal politics along different lines. Realists could point to examples such as the pre-World War I alliance between liberal France and Tsarist Russia, Communist China’s defection from the Soviet sphere of influence, and support by the democratic United States for friendly authoritarian states during the Cold War as evidence that power trumps ideas. In this context, ideologically-driven policies were at best the preserve of powerful states who faced little immediate threat (Krasner 1978), and even then

\textsuperscript{2}For the argument that overoptimism can produce costly conflict, see Blainey (1973). It is also of course possible that an ideology might make a leader unduly pessimistic about the use of force, rendering war less likely. Given that the costs of war make peace the norm when expectations are appropriately aligned (Fearon 1995), however, there is more room for excessive optimism to generate war than there is for undue pessimism to produce peace.
when power politics and ideology came into conflict, Realist prescriptions usually triumphed (e.g. Walt 1987; pp. 266-267, Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 191-192). More recent rationalist work that has extended and clarified the logic of Realist theory is less dogmatic in its fundamental materialism, but in practice has tended to deprecate ideas (e.g. indivisible issues) in favor of material concerns (e.g. shifting power and commitment problems) (see for example Fearon 1995; Powell 1999).

Waltzian Realism and its successors have come in for extensive criticism, of course. From the perspective of ideology, two sets of critiques are particularly salient. The observation of the democratic peace—the fact that jointly democratic dyads have been unusually unlikely to experience conflict—is widely seen as a refutation of the strong Realist argument that domestic politics play no role in international relations. That said, after an initial focus on norms-based explanations for the democratic peace that would allow for a significant role for legitimating ideology (Doyle 1986; Maoz and Russett 1993), the field has turned towards institutional explanations, following Kant’s (1957[1795]) argument that popularly elected leaders must avoid the costs of war if they are to retain power. In this view, the incentives and constraints facing democratic leaders allow them to signal resolve in ongoing crises more effectively (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998) and induce them to be particularly cautious about using force and to exert greater effort when fighting (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith 1999); these incentives in turn produce not only peaceful relations among democracies but a remarkable tendency to emerge victorious from those wars that democracies fight (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002). If the cooperative behavior of democracies is a function of their unique political institutions, then there is little room for more a more general relationship between ideological similarity and peace. More recent work, however, has identified evidence of a similar if less pronounced autocratic peace (Werner 2000; Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Bennett 2006), a finding that is hard to square with the view that unique institutional characteristics of democracy account for the liberal reluctance to fight.4

Separately, a central tenet of the internally diverse constructivist paradigm that developed in the 1990s is that mainstream international relations scholars have devoted too little attention to the

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3See however Walt (1996) for an argument by a self-identified Realist who assigns a more significant role of ideology, at least in revolutionary states.

4See Gartzke and Weisiger (2011) for an extension of this observation that treats regime type as a coordination mechanism whose strength varies with the prevalence of the regime in the international system more generally.
role of ideas in international relations (Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). Constructivists thus place much greater emphasis on questions of norms, identity, and legitimacy: for Wendt, even the continual war of Hobbesian anarchy may be sustained not by the coercive constraints of international anarchy but by a shared understanding (norm) of violence as legitimate and appropriate. Along these lines, Bukovasny (1999; 2002) argues that the American and French Revolutions, and the way in which they were justified, precipitated a shift in political culture from a norm of legitimation through hereditary monarchy to a more liberal order in which legitimacy derived from popular sovereignty. From this perspective, domestic political principles of legitimacy may come to influence the relations between states (e.g. Wendt 1999, pp. 361-364).

In the past decade, several scholars have built upon these insights to examine the connection between domestic political ideology and international conflict more specifically. Haas (2005) argues that ideology has consistently driven great power conflict since at least the French Revolution, with ideological difference producing conflict because leaders fear demonstration effects from the success of opposing ideologies elsewhere, because leaders rely on ideology in defining the “in-group” of friendly states, and because ideological difference hinders effective communication, increasing the likelihood of miscalculation. Based on this argument, he contends that ideological difference is a central source of great power war, and that wars involving great powers will tend to be more destructive. More recently, Owen IV (2010) argues that international political history has been characterized by repeated clashes of ideas, during which transnational ideological networks promote competing bases for domestic political legitimation. These contests produce waves of violence and foreign-imposed regime change, lasting until one basis for legitimation comes to be seen generally as preferably to the alternatives. For Owen, therefore, the international system alternates between periods of “normal” politics that operate on basically Realist lines and periods of ideological clashes, when ideological conflict begets additional ideological conflict. Both Haas and Owen demonstrate evidence for their arguments through case studies spanning a remarkable historical period.

The case study methods adopted for most work on ideology and conflict carry with them some limitations, however. Both Haas and Owen can point to the repeated occurrence of conflict across ideological lines, but it is entirely possible for these differences to exist without ideological difference
causing conflict. At the simplest level, ideological difference is quite common in international politics: working with the data on European legitimating ideologies described later in this paper, almost half of all dyad years involve a clash of legitimating ideologies. We should thus expect a significant number of conflicts and wars across ideological boundaries even if ideology has no effect on the probability of conflict. Moreover, leaders frequently demonize opponents in war to build domestic and international support for their war effort—ideological difference provides an obvious basis for criticizing one’s opponent. From this perspective, even when leaders explicitly cite ideological difference as a basis for conflict, we must entertain the possibility that other, less publicly palatable reasons underlie the fighting.

Methodologically, the challenge here is that both Haas and Owen, like almost anyone interested in using case study methods to examine the relationship between ideological difference and international conflict, find themselves selecting on the dependent variable in choosing cases. In the qualitative analysis of conflict, it is far easier to examine those wars that happen than those that do not, but focusing only on wars that occur creates the danger of assigning undue weight to factors that are frequently present, both in cases of conflict and in cases without conflict. Ultimately, quantitative statistical analysis across a wide range of countries should permit a better assessment of the general relationship between ideological difference and international conflict.\footnote{A separate potential concern, and one that this study is less well positioned to address, is that ideological difference might actually be endogenous to conflict, with leaders of countries with significant international disagreements choosing to legitimate their rule in different ways because of that disagreement. This concern is certainly pertinent for minor-power conflict during the Cold War: African leaders often saw adopting communism or capitalism as a way to attract superpower aid, whatever their true preferences. The focus of this paper on Europe allows me to avoid some of these concerns, as the most cynical examples of leaders adopting particular legitimating strategies to attract external assistance occur elsewhere in the world. This point will require further attention in future work, however.}

### 2.1 Building Testable Hypotheses

Rather than develop a general theoretical argument about ideological difference and conflict, I highlight four hypotheses from existing literature that merit further tests. The first three of these hypotheses concern ways in which ideological difference might relate to the onset of violent conflict. The fourth relates to conflict duration and severity.

The most obvious prediction is that ideological difference will be associated with conflict (or,
equivalently, that ideological similarity will produce peace). A given variable may produce violent conflict in international relations either by producing policy disagreements between countries or by affecting the ability of opponents to resolve policy disagreements without resorting to force (Fearon 1995). Ideological similarity and difference arguably can influence the probability of conflict in both ways.

Disagreements can stem from several potential sources. Most obviously, some ideologies are tied up with preferences (e.g. the overthrow of the capitalist order) that are anathema to many in other countries—the enduring, ideologically-grounded preference divergence between communism and the West generated disagreements that would not have existed in the absence of ideology.

In many cases, these disagreements coincide with and are amplified by fears of (or hopes for) demonstration effects. A monarch who faces a potential threat from domestic liberals typically would prefer not to see monarchs in neighboring states overthrown, as such an event might convince liberals in her country that regime change is possible and, perhaps more importantly, provides an obvious focal point around which a diffuse opposition might coordinate its activities (Haas 2005; Owen IV 2010)—the recent collapse of Hosni Mubarak’s government in Egypt and the outbreak of civil war in Libya provide pertinent examples, as neither likely would have happened absent the popular revolt that produced regime change in Tunisia. As war often creates significant threats to a leader’s hold on power (Chiozza and Goemans 2003), in considering whether to go to war with a state with a similar regime, a leader has to worry not only about the direct threat to her hold on power but also about the possible indirect threat that might arise if war unseats her opponent and encourages her domestic opposition. By contrast, if war against a state with a different legitimating ideology produces regime change, the effect is if anything likely to improve her hold on power by removing a source of encouragement for her domestic opponents. Thus, for example, the French invasion of Spain in 1823 was undertaken largely to return the Spanish king to his throne and thereby reduce the probability that a similar popular uprising would take place in France (or in

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6 For the logic of focal point equilibria, see Schelling (1960). When regime change requires that a large part of the population protest simultaneously, with each potential protestor worrying about the possibility of repression, it can be possible for a government to persist even in the face of substantial latent opposition if it can prevent opposition members from coordinating on a specific day to take to the streets. Major events such as rigged elections or regime change elsewhere thus often play a significant role in facilitating open resistance to the government.
the various monarchies that backed France diplomatically) (Nichols 1971). Moreover, as long as these demonstration effects exist (or are believed to exist), leaders have reason to view countries with similar regimes as friendly, while those with different regimes are less reliable. An ideologically similar neighbor can be trusted to the degree that an ideologically different neighbor cannot, simply because that leader must be leery of using attacking given the possibility of internal backlash.

Ideological difference also plausibly influences the probability that a given conflict will escalate to violence. The argument summarized above that a leader’s legitimating ideology tends to be associated in important ways with her theory of international politics provides a reason to expect this relationship to hold. People who hold similar theories of international politics will be better able to predict each other’s behavior, and thus will be less likely to blunder into war. Thus, even to the extent that disagreements arise between ideologically similar leaders, they should on average be better able to manage their differences peacefully.

H 1 Countries in which the domestic political basis for legitimating a leader’s hold on power differ will be more likely to come into conflict.

A more modest argument, which has been advocated by several Realists (Krasner 1978; Walt 1987), is that the strictures of the international system constrain most states from being able to afford luxuries like pursuing ideologically-based policies, but that the powerful are less subject to these constraints. Advocates of this perspective would point, for example, to the ideological basis for the American attack on Iraq in 2003—absent serious external threats, the United States could afford to launch a war of choice. From this perspective, we would expect ideological difference to be more strongly associated with conflict when one side in a relationship is relatively powerful. Taken to its logical extreme, this argument could imply that ideology is unimportant in international

7 Haas (2005) advances this argument most explicitly in the existing literature.
8 There is some theoretical slippage here: while power is generally understood to provide greater freedom of action in international relations, the international system is characterized by feedback effects (most obviously the balance of power) that may result in even relatively powerful states facing strong constraints (Jervis 1997). Thus, for example, Waltz (1979) argues that the increase in the relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union as a consequence of World War II simply produced a situation in which each was impelled by the system to counterbalance the other. In this case, strength will be a poor proxy for the degree of systemic constraint a state is exposed to; instead one might find that weak but peripheral states are least constrained. This argument would provide an explanation for the weak effects found later in the paper—it is worth noting, however, that most arguments that hold that ideology matters more for the unconstrained assume that more powerful states are less constrained.
politics most of the time, especially to the extent that the constraints of the international system bind tightly.

**H 2** Ideology will play a stronger role in the conflict behavior of great powers than it will in the conflict behavior of minor powers.

A third possibility follows directly from the logic of Owen’s (2010, esp. pp. 46-49) discussion of waves of ideological conflict. Owen argues that the relationship between transnational ideological competition—the simple clash of ideas—and foreign-imposed regime change is endogenous, with ideological competition creating an incentive for foreign-imposed regime change, which in turn buttresses ideological divisions. In short, by emphasizing the significance of ideological difference, a round of violent conflict along ideological lines encourages observers to align on similar terms, making future ideological conflict more likely. Owen (pg. 55) argues that this effect is primarily regional rather than international. His data could establish the existence of waves of ideological conflict, but whether this pattern reflected an endogenous process of polarization or simply captured changes in the level of international ideological diversity is unclear and merits further examination.

**H 3** Ideological rivals will be more likely to fight when there has been significant recent ideological conflict in their region.

Ideological difference has been connected not just to the initiation of conflict but also to its lethality. For many scholars, a central explanation for the destructiveness of World War II was the vast ideological differences between its fascist, communist, and democratic participants *****. While this claim is intuitively plausible, the underlying theoretical logic typically is not well articulated. Even if we accept the argument that ideologically different rivals are likely to have deeper disagreements than more ideologically similar states, it need not necessarily follow that wars among ideologically different states will be worse.

Geoffrey Blainey (1973) observed that ending wars requires resolving the problems that led to the outbreak of violence in the first place. A significant amount of rationalist work has built upon this observation, examining the implications of different theoretical mechanisms for war duration and severity (Goemans 2000; Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2004; Powell 2006; Weisiger 2010).
This work, however, has focused primarily on mechanisms—overoptimism, principal-agent dynamics in domestic politics, and so on—rather than on variables like ideological difference. It is thus worth exploring reasons why ideological difference might hinder conflict resolution.

One argument here would be that ideological difference increases the salience of conflicts, in the extreme turning them into wars to the death. If leaders see benefits from overthrowing ideological opponents and fear a potential internal backlash associated with displacing leaders who share their ideology, then they have an incentive to continue wars to drive ideological rivals out of power and to resolve intra-ideology wars quickly. The problem here, however, is that this argument is subject to important selection effects: precisely the same concerns that make leaders favor quick settlement with ideological allies makes them reluctant to go to war in the first place. By this logic, when war occurs between ideologically similar states, it is likely that the standard concerns that militate against violence are not present. If so, then we might not expect to see ideological difference make any difference for the destructiveness of wars.\footnote{This discussion is as yet underdeveloped, in part because my initial expectation was that ideological difference would be unrelated to war duration and severity (because of the selection effects argument advanced here). If readers have suggestions for more convincing theoretical links between ideology and war destructiveness, I would be very interested in hearing them.}

\textbf{H 4 Wars that pit countries adopting different domestic political ideologies will be longer and deadlier.}

\section{Coding Domestic Bases of Political Legitimation}

Testing these hypotheses will require data on the way in which leaders legitimate their hold on power. Thus, a substantial part of this research project involves the collection of such data. This section reviews the coding process and the resulting data, which as yet is limited to Europe, the United States, and Canada. I discuss the range of possible ideologies, challenges to coding and central coding decisions, and descriptive statistics on the data that has been gathered thus far.

The central goal of this data collection project is to identify the legitimating political ideology of the government of the country in question, over the standard Correlates of War period (1816 to the present). Europe alone has exhibited substantial variation on this front. Table 1 summarizes lists
the various legitimating ideologies included in the dataset. In total, the coding process identified 6 primary legitimating ideologies, of which one (despotism) never actually appears in the data. In addition, there are several hybrid ideologies, of which constitutional monarchy is by far the most common.

Without going into precise coding rules, the table gives a brief summary of the characteristics of each legitimating ideology. The most common ideology in Europe is liberal democracy, which is present for 46% of all country-year observations in the dataset, including almost 73% of observations since 1945. Next most common are monarchy and constitutional monarchy, each in the realm of 20% of the data, although both have become far less common as time has progressed. Soft authoritarianism, although historically rare at roughly 4% of all observations, has become more common over time, representing 6% of all observations after World War II and 7.5% of observations since 1989. Fascism, although historically important, is relatively rare, restricted temporally to the interwar period and cross-sectionally to a relatively small set of countries. Theocracy is ever rarer, represented in the dataset entirely by the Papal States prior to their incorporation into Italy in 1860. Despotism never enters as all leaders had some theoretical basis for legitimation of their rule. Figure 1 summarizes the relative prevalence of different legitimating ideologies in Europe over time, mapping the descent of monarchy and its replacement by liberal democracy, as well as the temporary spikes of other competing ideologies.

As with any data collection project, there are inevitably significant coding questions and important marginal cases. The obvious need for hybrid categories, especially in the case of constitutional monarchy, raises the question of where boundaries between ideologies exist. Although it is easy to identify ideal types of any ideology, many real-world cases exist along a continuum. To cite a specific example, the July Revolution of 1830 in France brought King Louis Philippe to the throne as King of the French rather than King of France, acknowledging a degree of popular sovereignty that the previous regime had rejected; more substantively, the revolution expanded the powers of the elected legislature, in particular shifting responsibility for initiating legislation to that body.

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[10] Note that percentages here and in table 1 exclude missing observations, which typically arise because of external occupation or internal collapse. Missing data account for just over 1% of all observations, although the manner in which they are handled is significant given the frequency with which the sources of missing codings are associated with further conflict.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimating Ideology</th>
<th>Description of Ideology</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Power is vested in an individual, who is selected according to the rules of dynastic succession</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>Legitimate power rests in the choice of the people, as expressed through popular elections</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>Rule is justified by the need to advance the interests of the working classes through state ownership of property, typically through a “dictatorship of the proletariat”</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fascism</td>
<td>Government is explicitly undemocratic, corporatist, and nationalist; right to rule flows from ability to advance the interests of the nation as a collective</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theocracy</td>
<td>Right to rule is primarily justified with respect to a higher deity; both laws and leadership are divinely ordained</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despotism</td>
<td>Right to rule is justified solely through force, with no covering ideology of legitimation</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hybrid Forms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Monarchy</td>
<td>Hybrid of monarchy and liberal democracy. Requires that both the monarch and the representative institutions exert significant influence over policy, and that representative institutions reflect the preferences of a sufficiently large subset of the population</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Hybrid of liberal democracy and despotism. Leader publicly justifies rule with respect to consent of the governed, but elections do not reflect public opinion and rule ultimately rests on control over instruments of repression</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despotic Monarchy</td>
<td>Hybrid of monarchy and despotism. Hereditary rule or monarchy serves as a central basis for legitimation, but effective power is held by someone who is neither the monarch nor a legitimate representative of the monarch (e.g. regency), typically based on control over the instruments of repression</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the same time, however, the franchise was limited to roughly 1% of the population, severely restricting the popular check on the king’s authority. While this system is coded in the data as constitutional monarchy, a reasonable argument can be made that the king—who after all continued to justify his rule primarily in dynastic terms—retained sufficient authority for the system to be considered a simple monarchy. This sort of problem is particularly severe when the underlying rules of legitimation and authority shift gradually over time, as in the case of late-19th century Italy, where the formally preponderant monarch increasingly deferred to the wishes of parliament without any sharp institutional change. Similarly, interwar Greece and early 20th-century Denmark provide examples of cases that reasonably could be coded either as constitutional monarchies, given the continued existence of a monarch with some constitutional powers, or as liberal democratic, given a general understanding, rarely if ever violated, that the king respected the wishes of the people as expressed through parliamentary elections. This problem also arises at the border between fascism and soft authoritarianism, as with Franco’s Spain. Nor, looking ahead to future coding efforts, is this problem confined to Europe, as the challenge raised by China’s transition away from communism makes clear.

Given potential debate about specific coding decisions, it is preferable to collect the data in
such a way as to permit robustness checks across cases. In the dataset, these observations are flagged, and additional variables contain the alternate possible coding. This approach allows me to ascertain whether specific coding decisions unduly influence statistical findings. In all, roughly 5% of observations are flagged in this manner.\textsuperscript{11}

The case of fascism poses a separate challenge. As was noted above, fascism as identified by the coding rules is relatively rare in the dataset, limited temporally to the interwar and World War II period and cross-sectionally to a relatively small set of (historically quite significant) states. That said, fascism bears similarities to at least some cases of the (arguably misnamed) category of soft authoritarianism, which is pertinent when the leader justifies her rule by reference to the will of the people but in practice rules autocratically. In particular, cases such as Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia arguably could be considered fascist, although given the discrediting of fascism as an ideology by World War II Milosevic never described himself as such. Although time constraints limited my ability to explore this issue more fully, in future work I plan to examine more carefully the consequences of adopting different boundaries for coding a regime as fascist.

A broader potential concern, of course, would be that the list of legitimating ideologies included here is either incomplete or, alternately, overly differentiated. It is a bit of a stretch to imagine, for example, that the popes who ruled the Papal States would see much kinship with the Ayatollah Khomeini, despite both their countries obviously fitting the coding requirements for theocracy. If significant fissures exist within a single coded legitimating ideology, then analysis based on the resulting data will inappropriately see conflict between differing states as evidence against a role for ideology. Addressing this concern requires remaining cognizant of ideological rifts that were salient in different regions or at different points in history. Thus, for example, future coding of Latin American states will differentiate between “liberal” (anti-clerical and opposed to traditional economic elites) and “conservative” (pro-church and opposing significant economic reform) regimes,

\textsuperscript{11}A second flag coding applies to cases in which legitimate debate exists as to whether an effective government is in place in the country. Thus, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina has a liberal democratic constitution and chooses representatives through popular elections, but in practice since the Dayton Accords effective power has rested with the externally appointed Office of the High Commissioner. Note that if it is clear that no government exists, as with, for example, Somalia after the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre, then the legitimating ideology is simply coded as missing, and the observation is not flagged. This flag coding is typically relevant only for a few years in a given time series, with the result that these cases constitute well under 1% of all observations.
which differed markedly in contemporary perceptions but would both be coded as soft authoritarian under the coding rules as applied to Europe.

Excessive differentiation by contrast raises the possibility that the data will identify clashes of ideologies that do not actually exist. This concern is most pertinent for the hybrid ideologies, which by definition share bases of legitimation with other regimes. Thus, for example, liberal democracy and constitutional monarchy are similar in many respects—the difference between them could not be expected to invoke the amount of mistrust that characterized relations between, for example, liberal France and the communist Soviet Union in the interwar period. By treating hybrid regimes as distinct, this coding project risks creating the illusion of ideological difference where none exists, which in turn might bias downward the observed effect of ideological difference on conflict (assuming that one actually exists). Historically, there exists variation in the extent to which the differences between “pure” and hybrid regimes were salient: despite significant checks on the Kaiser’s powers that made Germany a constitutional monarchy, Americans viewed Germany as ideologically other (at least once World War I began) (Oren 2003) in a way that they did not view, for example, Belgium.  

As such, it is not possible *ex ante* to identify a single ideal strategy for dealing with this concern. Instead, I develop two separate measures of ideological clashes. In the baseline measure, I code a clash of ideologies as present whenever the countries fall in different categories—this measure treats constitutional monarchy as distinct from both liberal democracy and monarchy. The alternate measure codes no clash as present whenever one country in a dyad adheres to a hybrid ideology while rule in the other is legitimated through one of the two “pure” ideologies from which the hybrid is formed. In this case, no clash would be present between a constitutional monarchy and a liberal democracy or between a constitutional monarchy and a full monarchy, but a class would continue to be present between a full monarchy and a liberal democracy. This more restrictive coding significantly decreases the prevalence of clashes of ideologies in the dataset: whereas under the first coding 47% of dyads experience a clash of ideologies, under the second only 30% do. Using both codings will allow us to determine the extent to which specific coding decisions drive empirical

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12 This observation obviously reminds us of the possibility discussed above that the relationship between ideological difference and conflict might be spurious, with war creating perceived ideological difference rather than ideological difference fomenting war.
results.\(^\text{13}\)

## 4 Statistical Analysis

Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 make predictions about conflict onset, whereas hypothesis 4 concerns conflict duration and severity. I thus test these hypotheses separately, starting with the relationship between ideology and conflict onset. I begin by discussing the specific ideology variables used in the analysis.

For hypotheses 1 and 4, which make predictions about the connection between ideological difference and conflict onset, duration, and severity, the characteristic of interest is whether or not the two countries that are interacting share a legitimating ideology. As I discuss above, there are multiple possible approaches that one might take to coding ideological difference. I use two here: one that codes ideological difference as present unless the two states are coded as having an identical legitimating ideology, and a second that codes no clash as present if one state operates under a hybrid ideology and while rule in the other is legitimated according to one of the component ideologies of the first. As there is good reason to think that whatever ideological difference exists between, for example, a constitutional monarchy and a monarchy will be substantially less than that between a monarchy and a communist state, I use the second variable in primary analyses.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that there will be a self-reinforcing effect of ideological conflict: one ideological conflict raises the salience of ideology in a region, making future conflict along similar lines more likely. Testing this hypothesis requires identifying a measure of recent levels of ideological conflict. I use two related approaches. First, following Owen’s focus on foreign-imposed regime change, which he argues is a particularly salient source of ideological polarization, I generate a variable using his data on incidents of foreign-imposed regime change (Owen IV 2010, pp. 11-21). A second approach measures the recent prevalence of militarized interstate disputes that cross ideological lines, with a dispute coded as crossing ideological lines if any two participants on

\(^{13}\)A separate potential complaint about excessive disaggregation would concern “totalitarian” regimes, which some have argued constitute a coherent category that most notably includes the paradigmatic cases of both communism and fascism, Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Obvious parallels do exist: both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were repressive, highly ideological, and governed by leaders who developed a cult of personality. For our purposes, however, this classification is clearly misleading, as the underlying ideologies of these two states differed greatly. Thus, for example, the observation that fascists gained credibility in part through their clear opposition to communism militates against conflating the two.
different sides have competing ideologies.\textsuperscript{14} In each case, I develop a yearly count of the number of relevant incidents and use that to create a weighted moving average, with more recent incidents weighted more heavily than more distant ones. I start with a yearly measure of ideological conflict \((\text{ideo})\), which is either a count of the number of incidents of foreign-imposed regime change or the share of all MIDs that crossed ideological lines. Indexing this yearly measure by \(t\) and given a count of the total number of states in the region \(s_t\) \textsuperscript{15} and a period of \(n\) years over which to construct the weighted average, I construct the recent conflict variable according to the following formula:

\[
\text{Ideological Conflict History}_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (n - i) \text{ideo}_{t-i}}{s_t \sum_{i=1}^{n} i}
\]  

The calculation using data on militarized interstate disputes is identical, except that \(\text{ideo}\) in this case captures the share of all MIDs that crossed ideological lines; given this change, the correction for the number of states in the system is inappropriate and is omitted. This formula generates a measure of recent ideological conflict that is weighted towards the more recent past, with more distant events weighted less heavily. For the statistical results, I use the weighted average over ten years, but I also conducted robustness checks using averages over five and 25 years, as well.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Control Variables} Work in international security has identified a large number of potential covariates with conflict. Given the preliminary nature of this analysis, the impracticality of evaluating a wide range of potential combinations of controls, and the desire to keep models relatively simple (Achen 2002; Clarke 2005), I focus on a set of standard variables that appear frequently in international relations analysis. The unit of analysis for this section is the dyad-year.\textsuperscript{17} Following King & Zeng (2001a; 2001b), I use \textit{relogit} to correct for the potential bias produced in binary

\textsuperscript{14}Future work will further explore the implications of coding decisions for results by comparing results when, for example, a dispute is coded as ideological only when all members on one side differ in legitimating ideology from all members on the other side.

\textsuperscript{15}I correct for the number of states in the region to account for the fact that increasing the number of states increases the number of opportunities for foreign-imposed regime change.

\textsuperscript{16}For analyses based on past militarized interstate disputes, this approach generates missing values for observations early in the dataset because data is unavailable for the period prior to 1816. As Owen records incidents of foreign-imposed regime change back to 1510, this problem is not pertinent for analyses that focus on foreign-imposed regime change.

\textsuperscript{17}Dyadic observations, the dependent variable, and control variables were generated using EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000). A Stata “do” file replicating data generation and analysis will be available upon publication.
dependent variable analysis when one outcome (here peace) is far more common than the other. I also correct standard errors for dyadic clustering and introduce temporal splines to control for duration dependence (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998).

- **Conflict**: To capture conflict, I rely on the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset, which contains instances of the threat, display, or use of force. To limit the potential for endogeneity, I lag the dependent variable by one year.\(^{18}\)

- **Democracy**: Most studies of international conflict control for dyadic democracy levels, given the observation that democratic dyads are unlikely to fight. Data on democracy comes from the Polity IV project, which codes two separate 0 to 10 indicators of autocracy and democracy, focusing on the selection of and constraints on the executive. Following the weakest-link approach advocated by Russett and Oneal (2001), I subtract each state’s autocracy score from its democracy score to generate a single 21-point scale and enter the lower of the two Polity scores as *Democracy (low)*.

- **Capabilities**: Dyadic capabilities, both relative and absolute, greatly influence the probability of conflict. I use the standard Composite Indicators of National Capabilities (CINC) scores from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, which produce an index based on objective bases of national power such as military size and expenditure, economic capacity, and total population, to measure state strength. *Relative Cap.* is the share of dyadic capabilities held by the stronger side in the dyad (\(\frac{\text{cap}_H}{\text{cap}_H + \text{cap}_L}\)). Moreover, greater absolute capabilities affect the ability of two states in a dyad to come to terms militarily (Hegre 2008). *Capability Sum* is the sum of the CINC scores of both states in the dyad.

- **Alliances**: Alliances are designed to manage conflict, whether by coordinating activities between states with similar interests or by helping states with divergent interests to manage their disagreements effectively ***. *Alliance* is a dummy variable that codes the presence of defense pact, neutrality pact, or entente, using alliance data from the Correlates of War (Gibler and Sarkees 2004).

\(^{18}\)Restricting the dependent variable to fatal MIDs (omitting disputes that consisted only of threats to use force or warning fire, for example) produces quite similar results to those presented here.
- **Major Power Status**: Major powers are among the more conflict-prone states in the international system (Levy 1985). I thus control for the presence of a major power in the dyad, using the standard COW criteria for major power status.

- **Contiguity**: Geography heavily conditions conflict behavior. More distant states are far less likely to fight than are neighbors. I thus control for the degree of contiguity between the states in the dyad, using COW contiguity data.\(^\text{19}\)

Table 2 reports results designed to test hypothesis 1, which predicts that ideological difference will be associated with an increased probability of conflict. Model 1 simply replicates standard findings from the literature. Consistent with our general expectations, joint democracy is associated with a reduced probability of conflict, more imbalanced dyads are more peaceful, increased dyadic capabilities (represented either through the sum of actor capabilities or through the presence of a major power in the dyad) are associated with an increased probability of conflict, and actors that are closer to each other are more likely to fight. Allied states also are less likely to fight, although this relationship (as in many other places in the literature) is not statistically significant.\(^\text{20}\) Model 2 replicates model 1 while restricting the sample to the European states for which I have ideology data. The results mirror those in model 1, except that the alliance variable is now statistically insignificant. The consistency of results from model 1 to model 2 provides reason to think that focusing solely on Europe will not overly influence the statistical results.

Model 3 adds the variable capturing a difference in legitimating regime to model 2. The results are strongly consistent with hypothesis 1: differences in legitimating ideology between countries are associated with a significant increase in the probability of conflict. Surprisingly, the lower democracy score is now statistically insignificant, although other results are unchanged. Model 4 substitutes an alternate coding of ideological clashes that codes no clash as present if one side adheres to a hybrid legitimating ideology (e.g. constitutional monarchy) while the other falls within one of the “pure” ideologies from which the hybrid is formed. As we would expect, coding marginal cases as not experiencing ideological clashes strengthens the relationship between ideological difference and

\(^{19}\text{Intercapital distance provides an alternate measure of proximity. Substituting distance for contiguity produces substantively identical results.}\)

\(^{20}\text{To save space, I do not report results for temporal splines in this table or in tables 3 and 4.}\)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2 Europe Only</th>
<th>Model 3 Ideology</th>
<th>Model 4 Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff. (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coeff. (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coeff. (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coeff. (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideo. Clash</td>
<td>0.813** (0.138)</td>
<td>1.082** (0.125)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (low)</td>
<td>-0.008* (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.024** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Cap.</td>
<td>-0.910** (0.149)</td>
<td>-1.345** (0.460)</td>
<td>-1.254** (0.427)</td>
<td>-1.413** (0.385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Sum</td>
<td>6.131** (0.395)</td>
<td>3.997** (0.870)</td>
<td>3.890** (0.823)</td>
<td>4.393** (0.754)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>-0.049 (0.066)</td>
<td>-0.228 (0.162)</td>
<td>-0.084 (0.158)</td>
<td>-0.058 (0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.810** (0.085)</td>
<td>0.917** (0.250)</td>
<td>0.929** (0.247)</td>
<td>0.974** (0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.622** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.304** (0.035)</td>
<td>-0.315** (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.326** (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.165** (0.126)</td>
<td>-2.083** (0.423)</td>
<td>-2.543** (0.394)</td>
<td>-2.436** (0.357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>538769</td>
<td>49874</td>
<td>49874</td>
<td>49874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: † : 10%  * : 5%  ** : 1% Standard errors clustered by dyad.
conflict. Once again, control variables are as expected, except that the low democracy score is now positive, if still insignificant. The weak findings for democracy once ideology is considered provide a potential reason to believe that the democratic peace is better explained by regime similarity than by the institutional features of democracy, although far more work is needed to better evaluate the sources of the difference. More importantly for my purposes, however, these results are clearly consistent with hypothesis 1. Working from the results in model 4, and holding control variables at median values, two states that differ ideologically are about three times as likely to experience a dispute than are states that share an ideology. The baseline expectation that ideological difference is a source of conflict is thus consistent with the historical record.

That said, given that conflict it rare, it is possible that even a trebling in the predicted probability of conflict could be associated with the essential irrelevance of ideology in most cases. If the Realist critique encapsulated in hypothesis 2 is correct, then ideology will matter primarily for the powerful, who are assumed to be less constrained by the international system. Table 3 examines this possibility.

If hypothesis 2 is correct, then the relationship between ideological difference and conflict should be associated primarily with the behavior of the relatively powerful. If so, then the interaction between ideological difference and a measure of capability should be positively associated with conflict, while the baseline effect of ideological difference will be attenuated once power is taken into account. Model 1 reports results when interacting the presence of an ideological clash with the presence of a major power in the dyad. Contrary to expectations, the involvement of a major power is associated if anything with a reduction in the probability that a dyad experiences

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21 Joint democracy is of course one example of the absence of ideological clashes, and indeed given the recent spread of democracy roughly 62% of cases in which no ideological clash exists involve liberal democracies (not all of which, however, meet the standard Polity threshold of 7 to be considered institutionally democratic). Interestingly, if I drop all observations in which either country was coded as a liberal democracy from either model 3 or model 4, ideological difference is still associated with an increased probability of conflict at a statistically significant level, indicating that the effect is not purely about joint democracy.

22 The second half of this prediction concerns the observed effect of a lower-order interaction term, which can be difficult to interpret directly (Braumoeller 2004; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). In this case, the observed effect of the ideological difference variable can be interpreted as the effect when the other term in the interaction takes a value of zero. Thus, for model 1, the coefficient for ideological difference represents the effect of ideological difference on the probability of conflict when neither country is a great power. As the relative capabilities variable is bounded between .5 and 1 by construction, there is no valid direct interpretation of the ideological difference variable in model 3.
Table 3: Interactive Ideology Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: MID Onset</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideo. Clash</td>
<td>1.273**</td>
<td>0.930**</td>
<td>2.466**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.560)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clash * Major Power</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
<td>0.611*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>1.125**</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>1.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.290)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clash * Rel. Cap.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.711*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.681)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Cap.</td>
<td>-1.405**</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
<td>(0.564)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (low)</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Sum</td>
<td>4.384**</td>
<td>6.153**</td>
<td>4.314**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.757)</td>
<td>(0.752)</td>
<td>(0.739)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.326**</td>
<td>-0.352**</td>
<td>-0.330**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.554**</td>
<td>-2.998**</td>
<td>-3.158**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td>(0.489)</td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>49874</td>
<td>49874</td>
<td>49874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: †: 10%  *: 5%  **: 1% Standard errors clustered by dyad.
conflict, although the relationship is not statistically significant. Model 2 substitutes a variable that takes a value of 1 only when both countries in the dyad are great powers and modifies the interaction accordingly. Results now conform to expectations, with great power dyads that are characterized by ideological difference experiencing more conflict. Jointly great power dyads do not seem to provide the scenario in which the traditional Realist argument that unconstrained powers are more likely to pursue ideological interests applies, however, suggesting that this relationship may hold for reasons other than those proposed by theory. Finally, model 3 introduces an interaction between ideological difference and relative capabilities, based on the potential argument that states that are particularly powerful within the dyad (captured by situation in which the relative capabilities variable is relatively large) are likely to take stronger cues from ideological difference in their interactions with their weaker neighbors. As with model 1, however, the interaction term has the wrong sign, implying that ideological difference is associated with a reduction in conflict in unequal dyads, and in this case the relationship is statistically significant. Overall, then, the results from Europe provide little reason to believe that ideology matters only for the relatively unconstrained.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that recent ideological conflict will be associated with an increased probability of future ideological conflict, based on the argument that ideological conflict heightens the salience of ideological difference in international politics. Table 4 contains tests of this prediction. Models 1 and 2 test this hypothesis using Owen’s data on foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC), using a weighted moving average of the number of incidents of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC History, the calculation of which is described above), which is then interacted with the measure of ideological difference. If hypothesis 3 is correct, this interaction term should be positive. Model 1, which uses incidents of foreign-imposed regime change over the previous ten years, demonstrates partial support: the interaction term is positive, as expected, but insignificant. In model 2, I substitute a 25-year weighted average for the ten-year average. In this specification, the interaction proves to be positive and statistically significant, consistent with expectations.23

23The negative and statistically significant effect of FIRC History implies that ideologically similar dyads become less likely to experience conflict when recent levels of foreign-imposed regime change increase. This observation is consistent with theory: by heightening the salience of ideological divisions, recent ideological conflict should increase the perceived threat from states that are ideologically different and hence produce a disincentive to fight with ideologically
Table 4: Recent History and Ideological Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: MID Onset</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIRC (10)</td>
<td>FIRC (25)</td>
<td>MIDs (10)</td>
<td>MIDs (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideo. Clash</td>
<td>0.987***</td>
<td>0.718**</td>
<td>0.785**</td>
<td>0.447***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clash * FIRC History</td>
<td>7.062</td>
<td>24.692*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.261)</td>
<td>(12.066)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRC History</td>
<td>-8.573</td>
<td>-40.479**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.596)</td>
<td>(7.728)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clash * MID History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.852*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.613*</td>
<td>-0.805*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (low)</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.016†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Cap.</td>
<td>-1.355**</td>
<td>-1.115**</td>
<td>-1.163**</td>
<td>-1.028*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Sum</td>
<td>4.508**</td>
<td>4.956**</td>
<td>4.664**</td>
<td>4.506**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.780)</td>
<td>(0.801)</td>
<td>(0.773)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.943**</td>
<td>0.798**</td>
<td>0.920**</td>
<td>0.909**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.326**</td>
<td>-0.321**</td>
<td>-0.323**</td>
<td>-0.320**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.342**</td>
<td>-1.964**</td>
<td>-2.237**</td>
<td>-2.201**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.346)</td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>49874</td>
<td>49874</td>
<td>48287</td>
<td>45255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: †: 10%  *: 5%  **: 1% Standard errors clustered by dyad.
Model 3 extends this analysis by examining the impact of recent disputes in the region on the probability that any given dyad ends up fighting. The measure of recent disputes here is a weighted average of the yearly percentage of militarized interstate disputes that crossed ideological lines: per the hypothesis, the more ideologically polarized recent conflict has been, the more we should expect future conflict to occur across ideological lines. Consistent with this hypothesis, an interaction between the presence of an ideological clash and the proportion of recent MIDs that have occurred across ideological lines is positive, indicating that ideologically different states are more likely to clash when recent conflict has followed ideological lines. The variable falls short of standard levels of statistical significance, however. Interestingly, when focusing on history over either a five-year period or a 25-year period, the interaction term is positive and significant at at least the \( p < .05 \) level. Model 4 presents the results for the 25-year period. Overall, then, these results are consistent with the endogenous relationship that Owen argues exists between ideological polarization and ideological conflict, at least for the continent of Europe.

To summarize, the statistical analysis of conflict onset suggests that domestic legitimating ideology does have important connections to the use of force in international politics. Countries that share a legitimating ideology appear to be significantly less likely to use force against each other than are countries that differ on this score. There is little evidence that this effect is concentrated among the relatively powerful states, contrary to some Realist arguments that allowing ideology to influence foreign policy is a luxury that only those relatively free of systemic constraints can afford. Moreover, the statistical analysis lends some initial support to the prediction that a recent history of ideological conflict increases the probability that ideological rivals will come into conflict, consistent with Owen IV’s (2010) argument that the world goes through waves of ideological polarization, during which ideological difference is highly salient, as well as periods of depolarization in which ideology plays a less important role.

\[ \text{similar states.} \]
4.1 Ideological Clashes and War Destructiveness

Hypothesis 4 predicts that ideological difference will produce longer and deadlier wars. For tests of this hypothesis, I rely on the data and methods used in Weisiger (2010). Observations consist of interstate wars over the entire post-1815 period. In line with most studies of war duration and outcome (Bennett and Stam III 1996; Goemans 2000; Reiter and Stam 2002), I disaggregate several large multilateral conflicts into component wars. The primary dataset contains a total of 103 observations.

The primary dependent variable for duration analysis is war duration, measured in days from the date of first fighting to the date of last fighting. This information comes from preliminary data for the War Initiation and Termination project (Fazal et al. 2006). Following the logic of game-theoretic models of the conduct and termination of war (Filson and Werner 2002; Smith and Stam 2003; Powell 2004), I distinguish between conquest and settlement as types of war termination, allowing for the possibility that variables may, for example, hasten the date of one side’s military collapse while simultaneously hindering the opponents’ ability or willingness to resolve their differences at the bargaining table. Data on the nature of war termination comes from Weisiger (2010).

War duration is, of course, only one measure of the destruction that a war causes, and far from the most direct one. Deaths from war is the most obvious alternative, if one that raises theoretical and empirical challenges. Many war-related deaths are indirect: people die of starvation because of economic disruption or because farmers were dragooned to the front, while others die in epidemics that would not have occurred (or would not have been so deadly) absent the dislocations associated with war. In this context, determining how many “excess” deaths a war caused is almost impossible.

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24Correlates of War duration data, the standard in the literature, frequently measures war duration using diplomatic indicators of war onset and termination such as declarations of war or peace treaties. As many theoretical arguments about war duration and closely connected to the costs of fighting, the former measure is preferable. In practice, of course, there is typically little difference in war duration measured in either manner (although a few significant discrepancies do arise); results are substantively identical substituting the COW measure for the primary measure used here.

25Other, even more problematic measures include the extent of economic destruction and the suffering that war imposes on those who do not die.

26See for example the debate over the number of Iraqi deaths following the 2003 invasion (e.g. Burnham et al. 2006,
weapons—is frequently impossible for civilians, for whom no records are usually kept. The best information, if still far from perfect, is available for soldiers, especially for those who die in fighting with the enemy. Analyses of war severity use information from Clodfelter (2007), who provides detailed data on war casualties that is more reliable than that available from COW.27

Data on political ideology is identical to that developed for the analysis of conflict onset and escalation, with two exceptions. First, given the smaller number of interstate wars, it is both feasible and desirable to collect initial data on all war participants over the standard Correlates of War period, meaning that these results are not restricted to Europe.28 More precisely, given the challenges associated with multilateral wars, I identify a primary dyad in each conflict and code the legitimating ideology of the government on each side of that dyad, and use that coding to classify a conflict as either experiencing an ideological clash or not.29 Second, given the smaller number of wars and greater confidence about their starting dates, it is possible to revisit codings in cases in which changes in the legitimating basis for rule occurred after January 1 of a year but prior to the onset of a war. This situation is most pertinent when events produce a transition away from liberal democracy, as when defeat by Germany brought an end to the French Third Republic prior to France’s 1940 war with Thailand, or when a military coup overthrew the elected government of Cyprus shortly before the Turkish intervention in 1974. Overall, ideological difference is quite common in war: 58% of wars involved a clash of ideologies even under the relatively restrictive coding rule (70% under the more expansive rule).

Control variables for the analysis of war duration and severity include several that were used in the analysis of conflict onset and escalation, including contiguity, relative capabilities, and major power status. Bennett and Stam (1996) find that the choice of military strategy greatly influences war duration, with punishment strategies associated with longer wars and maneuver strategies

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27 For more information on the relative merits of Clodfelter and COW, see Weisiger (2010, pg. 72).
28 Comparing the findings from an analysis of purely European wars to all interstate wars over the relevant period does, however, provide a basis for speculation about the degree to which findings on conflict onset and escalation will remain stable once the ideology data are expanded to the entire post-1815 world.
29 Note that the decision to disaggregate large multilateral conflicts with multiple fronts means that the identification of a primary dyad is almost always not difficult.
associated with substantially shorter ones. I thus control for the choice of military strategy, using codings from their study where possible and coding observations that were not in their dataset myself. The variable is an ordered scale of attacker and defender strategy choices, with higher values associated with an increased expected war duration. Several studies have also found that rough terrain is associated with longer wars; I control for the roughness of terrain using data from Slantchev (2004). Given a number of arguments about the implications of regime type for war duration and severity, I also include the Polity score of the losing side in a war. Finally, for analyses of war severity, I include a control for the total population of all war participants, using population data from COW’s National Military Capabilities dataset.

Both war duration and war deaths are strictly positive, raising potential concerns about heteroskedasticity and inappropriate predicted values in ordinary least squares regression. Moreover, OLS cannot account for the possibility of multiple forms of war termination, a problem here given the desire to distinguish between war termination through military conquest and war termination through negotiated settlement. I thus instead turn to event history or duration analysis. In particular, I make use of competing risks duration analysis (Fine and Gray 1999). Given that ideological difference is more likely to hinder the ability of warring parties to reach a negotiated settlement than it is to influence how long it takes for one side to collapse militarily, in multiple-failure analyses I focus on war duration until settlement.

4.2 Statistical Results for War Duration and Severity

Table 5 contains results from tests of hypothesis 4. For all models, I report variable coefficients rather than hazard ratios: positive coefficients imply a higher probability of war termination at any point and hence a reduced expected war duration. It is helpful first to get a general sense of the relationship between ideological difference and war duration. Model 1 presents results from a Cox proportional hazard regression with no controls. Contrary to expectations, ideological difference is associated if anything with quicker war termination, although the relationship is not statistically significant. Model 2 introduces a range of standard controls. Results are quite similar, with ideological difference still positive and now marginally significant, suggesting that the unexpected
relationship between ideology and war duration is not a consequence of omitted variable bias.

Table 5: Ideology and War Duration and Severity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: MID Onset</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>(Settlement)</td>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>(Settlement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideo. Clash</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.382†</td>
<td>-0.522†</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.654*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Initiator</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.771*</td>
<td>0.820*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser Dem. Level</td>
<td>0.031†</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>-1.430**</td>
<td>-0.608</td>
<td>-0.833</td>
<td>-0.332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
<td>(0.582)</td>
<td>(0.523)</td>
<td>(0.628)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Cap.</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>-0.269</td>
<td>1.485†</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(1.010)</td>
<td>(0.808)</td>
<td>(0.999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Participants</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.315†</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
<td>-0.417*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.386)</td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Strategy</td>
<td>-0.374**</td>
<td>0.215†</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.298‡</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(Population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.351*</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (settlements) | 103 | 86 | 86 (60) | 86 | 86 (60)

Significance levels: †: 10%  *: 5%  **: 1% Robust standard errors reported.

As I noted above, however, theoretical studies of bargaining in war make a distinction between negotiated settlement and military conquest as types of war termination. A conventional Cox model that pools both types of termination may thus miss important effects if a variable has offsetting effects on the speed with which different outcomes are reached. In this case, it is possible that ideological difference might hamper attempts to resolve disagreements at the bargaining table but not be associated with worse wars in general because military conquest occurred unusually quickly in wars between ideologically diverse rivals. Model 3 explores this possibility by switching to a competing risks format that treats settlement and conquest as distinct types of war termination, focusing in particular on war duration until settlement. In this case, a markedly different picture emerges: ideological difference is associated with greater war duration until settlement, at a level
that is marginally statistically significant (p=.055). Examining war duration until military conquest (not included to save space) reveals a countervailing effect: when a clash involves ideological rivals, it is significantly more likely to reach conquest quickly.\(^\text{30}\)

It is possible that long but low-intensity wars skew this analysis. Models 4 and 5 thus shift the dependent variable to total deaths in war. Model 4 uses a Cox specification, following the approach in model 2 but inserting a control for the total population of the war participants. The results parallel those for war duration: ideological difference is associated if anything with less deadly wars, albeit not at a statistically significant level. Model 5 shifts to the competing risks framework. Once again, introducing the distinction between war termination through settlement and war termination by military conquest uncovers a significant effect. When ideological rivals go to war, on average more battlefield deaths accumulate before they reach a settlement than would have had they shared an ideology. Again, a paired analysis of war duration until conquest indicates that ideological difference in war is associated with quicker conquest.

Taken together, these findings imply a nuanced assessment of hypothesis 4, and one that merits further investigation. On the one hand, ideological difference does not appear to be associated with longer or deadlier wars. On the other, ideological rivals do appear to take longer to reach a negotiated settlement to their conflicts, suggesting that ideology may play a role in the conduct and termination of these wars. In particular, the unexpected finding that ideological difference is associated with quicker conquest, for which there is no obvious theoretical explanation, raises the possibility of omitted variable bias of some sort that is not addressed through the set of controls used here. Should this unexpected relationship arise because of the failure to control for a relevant covariate of duration until conquest, then a stronger general effect of ideological difference on war destructiveness might emerge. Further work thus is clearly necessary to better understand this relationship.

\(^{30}\)Perhaps unsurprisingly, both effects are influenced by World War II, which in primary analysis is disaggregated into multiple component conflicts, some of which (like the German conquests of Poland and of France) reached conquest quite quickly, and some of which (like the war with Britain, the invasion of the Soviet Union, or the war in the Pacific) endured for years without a settlement arising. In particular, dropping the long World War II conflicts from the dataset results in the ideological difference variable losing statistical significance in the analysis of war duration until settlement, although it retains a negative sign.
5 Conclusion

This paper seeks to advance our understanding of the relationship between ideology and international conflict by exploring in greater detail the connection between the way in which leaders legitimate their rule internally and the way that they behave externally. I introduce new data on the nature of legitimating ideology in Europe over the 1816-2008 period and use it to test several arguments about the relationship between ideological difference and conflict. In statistical analysis, I find that ideological difference is strongly associated with an increased probability of conflict, that this effect is not driven primarily by the behavior of the relatively powerful, that there is evidence for waves of ideological conflict over time, and that while ideological difference does not appear to produce worse wars in general, it may be associated with greater difficulty ending wars through negotiation. Future work will expand on the underdeveloped related arguments, expand the statistical analysis to the full universe of independent states since 1815, extend the statistical analysis to better understand unexpected findings and further assess the robustness of statistical results, and couple the statistical analysis with historical case studies that can better demonstrate the influence of ideology on war in specific instances in history.
References


Weisiger, Alex. 2010. “From Small Wars to Armageddon: Explaining Variation in Interstate War Duration and Severity.” book manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.

