

Fundamentalism, Politicized Religion & Pietism

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The Fundamentalism Project, Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby, eds. Volume I: *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Volume III: *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics, and Militance*, 1993); Volume IV: *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements* (1994)

THE EDITORS describe the volumes produced by the Fundamentalism Project as textbooks, encyclopedias and monographs, as well as trade books for the "literate public" (I, pp. xii-xiii).¹ Unfortunately, among the results of this effort to make the project so many different things are a number of unacknowledged contradictions—contradictions within the conceptual apparatus offered by the editors, contradictions between the general claims they make about the phenomenon(a) of "Fundamentalism(s)" and the evidence contained in many individual contributions, contradictions among the prefatory and synthetic essays attached to various Parts of each volume and contradictions between those essays and the individual studies to which they are putatively related. As befits an encyclopedia, the exoticism or topicality of a subject or its contribution to achieving wider coverage seem to prevent the editors from excluding fascinating but, from the standpoint of understanding "fundamentalism," *analytically* uninteresting treatments. At the same time, the editors try mightily to present the project as a scholarly, comparative and conceptually responsible work, which required them to face squarely the definition question of what they and their contributors mean by "fundamentalism."

Despite their own ruffles and flourishes and amidst what was obviously intense disagreement among their chosen contributors, the editors fail to deal effectively with this basic question. To be sure, defining the term would have meant excluding the work of some of their potential contributors. Perhaps to avoid this difficulty, and to deflect criticisms of the connotations and specific etymology of the term, they end up somewhat desperately suggesting that "fundamentalism" not be defined. Instead, they propose an approach described as Wittgensteinian—to discover "family resemblances" among the phenomena described by the particular group of scholars they have assembled. But not only do none of the contributors abide by this approach, even the editors end up speaking of things that are true of fundamentalism "*as a matter of principle*"² and offering general propositions about the causes and dynamics of fundamentalism that cannot be asserted without a non-Wittgensteinian, *intensive* definition of the term. One obvious consequence of this definitional predicament is that their conclusions can be no more than arid generalities—e.g., "one of the clear conclusions of this volume [III] is that fundamentalist activism yields intended and unintended consequences..." (p. 628).

According to the editors, Volume I in the series was supposed to provide

survey-type essays that would introduce the wide range of phenomena to which the "fundamentalist" label might be attached. Volume II (not reviewed here) was devoted to analyzing the various impacts that fundamentalist movements have had on society and culture. The essays in Volume III were intended to analyze the impacts of fundamentalist movements in political and economic realms. Volume IV was intended to focus on the relationship between the changing organizational frameworks of fundamentalist movements and changes in the ideas they espouse and the policies they promote. But there is so much overlap among essays in different volumes that volume-by-volume review of these works makes little sense.

Here, I deal with the 29 individual essays in these volumes that deal with Jewish or Islamic themes.³ In my own work on the subject, I have defined fundamentalism as an uncompromising political style whose decisive elements are (1) motivation to achieve radical transformation of society (2) according to directly felt transcendental imperatives and (3) through political means.⁴ Movements can vary in how fully they meet each criterion, and a useful theory of fundamentalism could predict different trajectories for different movements depending on the particular mix of attributes they display along these three dimensions.

This definition concentrates on fundamentalism as a political style. It would exclude movements, no matter how exotic or fervently religious, if their sense of connection to cosmic imperatives did not lead to political action or did not lead them to seek radical transformation of society. Other movements, even if not explicitly religious, might be classified as fundamentalist if transcendental imperatives act as the functional equivalent of a divine command. I wager that it is this fusion of directly experienced transcendental values to uncompromising political stands and action in the political realm to achieve comprehensive change that interests those who will read books and articles about "fundamentalism."

In these terms, we may distinguish between fundamentalist religious movements and what we may label pietistic religious movements. Politicized pietistic movements seek, according to their own parochial interests, to influence but not radically to transform their political, social and economic environment; isolationist pietistic movements avoid the political arena as much as possible or act in the political arena mainly in order to secure their isolation from it. Where the authors of the essays on Muslim and Jewish movements resort to a veritable blizzard of terms, categories and qualifiers, almost none of which are used in the same way,⁵ these distinctions of fundamentalism from pietism, and of isolationist pietism from politicized pietism, identify the politically interesting and recurrent themes in these essays.

None of the authors is particularly sympathetic to fundamentalist aspirations. For a few, a primary purpose seems to be to highlight the dangers or objectionable nature of these movements. The main theme of Sprinzak's discussion of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel (III) is the threat posed by fundamentalist violence to Israeli democracy. Rapaport's essay (III) essentially equates fundamentalism with illegal religiously inspired violence (raising the obvious question of whether violence perpetrated "legally" under the laws now in force in Iran or

Sudan thereby ceases to be "fundamentalist"). Mayer's discussion of Sudan and Iran (III) shows how shockingly liberal democratic norms of legality and due process are violated by fundamentalist regimes in those countries. Rafiuddin Ahmed's treatment (IV) of the Jama'at-i-Islami emphasizes its ruthless use of violence as one key element in its struggle to dominate Pakistan and Bangladesh.

A more important focus, however, is on the etiology, not the value, of fundamentalist movements. In their overall comments about the essays, Marty and Appleby characterize fundamentalists as fighters against modernization, "as traditionalists who perceive some challenge or threat to their core identity, both social and personal... They react... they fight for... fight with... fight against others... fight under God... or under the signs of some transcendent reference..." (I, p. ix). Fundamentalism, they opine, is a "religiously inspired reaction to aspects of the global process of modernization and secularization" (III, p. 2). But in the essays pertaining to the most radical and politicized, the most "fundamentalist" of the organizations, this does not seem to be the case. The two essays that do explicitly offer this kind of mass-psychic-strain explanation for the etiology of fundamentalist movements—Sachedina's treatment (I) of Shi'ism in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon and Nash's discussion (I) of the Dawkat in Malaysia—show only that this was one factor contributing to enthusiasm for the movement, either because modernization was linked to western colonialism (Sachedina) or because of the psychic strains and competitive disadvantages it imposed on socially mobilized members of the new middle class (Nash).

Of much greater significance, though hardly mentioned by Marty and Appleby, is the role of elites conveniently positioned to recraft religious idioms and to create fundamentalist movements in the process of advancing parochial interests (e.g., Malay ethnic jealousies) and in the context of weak, failed or oppressive regimes. Inspiring messianic ideas help these elites not so much to fight *against* (or in reaction to) modernization or secularism, but to transform society *toward* an ideal future state. Thusly Sachedina emphasizes the genuinely messianic sentiments of adherents to the Shi'i movements he examines. Aran, in his analysis of Gush Emunim in Israel (I), explicitly rejects the reaction-to-modernization thesis precisely because Jewish fundamentalism (defined in his essay almost exactly as I have) is motivated first and foremost by an eschatological/messianic vision for the transformation of Israel and the redemption of the world.

Secular elites and their politics can also play a key role in producing fundamentalism. Hugh Roberts, in a startling and detailed analysis of FIS in Algeria (IV), shows how Muslim fundamentalism can be elicited from an Islamic milieu by democratization and other tactics and policies of secular political elites. In an analysis that reminds one of the consequences of Sadat's attempt to use Islamic fundamentalism against rivals on the Egyptian left, Roberts explains the rise of FIS and its particular characteristics not only by the structural failures of the Algerian state, but also by the short-sighted efforts of Chadli to use democratization in 1988 against his rivals in the FLN. Here modernization, in the form of the discourse and methods of democracy, is what produced a fundamentalist movement ready to cling loyally to elections as its route to power.

Marty and Appleby stress that their interest is in "modern fundamentalisms" appearing in the 20th century and especially after World War II. Still an important element in many of these movements is their continuity or discontinuity with earlier manifestations of religious revivalism. Roberts shows how FIS is linked to the long struggle of orthodox, urban-based Islamic reformists (associated with the Salafiyists of the early decades of this century) against rural-based maraboutic Islam, and to the struggle between the Ben-Badis movement of 'ulama reformers and the secularist FLN for control of the Algerian revolution and its legacy. John Voll (I) identifies contemporary Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt and the Sudan with 18th and 19th century Wahhabist and Mahdist movements. Sachedina makes a strong argument that the fundamentalist impulse is a genuine one within the Shi'i cultural repertoire, tracing the role of 'ulama and charismatic leaders who, in response to new challenges and opportunities, found ways that militance could be combined with or substituted for dissimulation.

Two findings about fundamentalist (as opposed to pietist) movements emerge most clearly. Prospects for fundamentalist success have been declining, and those movements which have experienced substantial success have become less fundamentalist. Liebman's discussion of Gush Emunim (III) emphasizes how the bulk of religious Jews in Israel act as a restraining influence that, along with the countervailing power of Israeli secularists, keeps Gush Emunim's impact on Israeli society at a minimum—this despite its influence in the 1970s and 1980s on Israeli government settlement policies in the West Bank. Aran makes a similar point, as does Don-Yehiya (IV), whose argument that the intrinsically anti-radicalist, ritualistic culture of orthodox Judaism makes Jewish fundamentalism a self-limiting phenomenon corresponds closely to Auda's account (IV) of the "normalization" of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt due to the nature of Sunni Islam and the sophisticated use of that cultural fact by the Egyptian regime.

Don-Yehiya is one of several authors who make the closely related point that the fundamentalist movements they are studying are, in fact, becoming less fundamentalist. Keddie and Monian (III) show how the fundamentalist state Khomeini built in Iran has drawn back from Khomeini's own preference for exporting the revolution. Kramer (III) offers a similar judgment that Hizbullah in Lebanon may abandon its fundamentalist ambitions out of a calculation that violence alone cannot change the world. In a caustic analysis of the Islamic Republic, Arjomand (III) notes how the absolutist/totalitarian aspect of Khomeini's "rule of the jurist" conflicts with both the pluralism of Iranian Shi'a society and the simple requirements of governance, resulting in the bureaucratic incorporation of "secular" matters into religious jurisprudence and the substantial contamination of the fundamentalist vision. In their separate treatments of the Jama'at in Pakistan, both Mumtaz Ahmed (I) and Rafiuddin Ahmed (III) describe the evolution of that originally fundamentalist movement into a political organization ready to compromise, maneuver, shift alliances and recast its positions in order to increase and protect its share of power.

At least as many of the chapters in these volumes concern pietistic as fundamentalist movements, although some include analysis of organizations falling within different categories. In contrast to the accounts of fundamentalism, most

authors who describe isolationist pietism portray the movements as enjoying considerable success in their efforts to maintain and reinforce separation from the larger society and intensify the quality of their religious experience. Mumtaz Ahmad's illuminating account of the growth of the Tabligh in Pakistan presents the puzzle of how its members and leaders are able to resist temptations to make political demands. Barbara Metcalf's warm, participant-observer account (IV) of the routines and satisfying emotional life of Tabligh adherents helps answer the questions raised by Ahmad's essay. Another semi-endorsement of a pietistic movement is Birai's essay (I) on the Islamic Tajdid (renewal) movement in Nigeria and the contribution he believes it can make to the spiritual life of the country. Selengut (IV) and Solveitchik (IV), each writing about the Haredi (ultra-orthodox) communities in Israel and the United States, describe an extraordinarily successful neotraditionalist strategy whereby available subsidies finance increasingly stringent devotion to ritual and an unprecedentedly comprehensive system of lifetime seminaries that reinforce the isolation of these communities while moving steadily further from anything that could objectively be considered "traditional Judaism." It is precisely the *non*-fundamentalist aspect of these groups that helps explain their success. This point is confirmed by Ravitzky (IV) and Friedman (IV), whose separate studies of the Lubavitch (Habad) Hasidim evaluate the prospects for this Hasidic sect to survive its recent dalliance with fundamentalism—an impulse toward activist, politicized messianism associated with the late Rebbe's hawkish views on Israeli politics and the fervid if disappointed belief among his followers that the Rebbe himself was the Messiah.

The last group of essays concerns politicized religion. The authors of these essays analyze politically active (non-fundamentalist) pietist movements of varying ambitions. Their judgments about these groups revolve around whether they are gaining influence, whether they are manipulated by governments, how the realities of their political environment and the tactics of ruling elites constrain their behavior and shape their development, or how they develop long-term survival strategies in fundamentally hostile settings. Saroyan's essay (IV) on the Muslim Boards in the Soviet Union and its Muslim successor states and Nash's treatment of the Dawkat in Malaysia portray Muslim elites (official and unofficial, respectively) who have learned to manipulate the state and adapt to changes in it without seeking to conquer it. Kane's essay (IV) on the orthodox Islamic reform movement Izala in Nigeria notes (as do several others) the role Saudi financing plays in sponsoring movements aimed at combating heterodoxy or indigenized forms of "folk Islam," but emphasizes symbiosis between the movement and the regime, each seeing in Islamic reformism a formula for fostering modernization (*sic!*) and the urban, anti-tribalist values associated with it. The Heilman and Friedman essay (I) surveys the range of modest to extensive political efforts by Haredi sects in Israel to extract the privileges and subsidies their neotraditionalist communities need. Similarly, Mardin in his discussion of the Nakshibendi order in Turkey (III) and Legrain (IV) in his discussion of the Muslim Brothers and Hamas in Palestine portray Islamic organizations that operate extremely prudently, holding long-term survival as their highest priority against a tolerable but ultimately hostile political environment.

More of these authors, however, tell of movements whose struggles to survive or to influence state policies have been less successful. The central theme in these treatments is that the movements themselves reflect the environments and repressive success of the regimes they face. Mayer's view of the Jama'at is that its Islamization campaign has been harnessed by the regime for its own political ends. Baram (IV) portrays the Iran-sponsored Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq as similarly harnessed to Tehran's foreign policy objectives, reflecting in its own bureaucratic, 'ulema-run structure the structure and preferences of its patron, while the more independently oriented Da'wa group inside Iraq adopted modern forms of organization and a democratic discourse as part of its strenuous effort simply to survive. Roy (III) stresses the almost complete failure of Islam in Afghanistan as a political identity that might have overcome ethnic fragmentation. Kuran (III) argues strongly that "Islamic economics," no matter how it has been or will be presented, cannot withstand the same laws of neoclassical economics that thwarted socialism. Nash shows how effectively the secular nationalist Indonesian regime has used repression and natural Indonesian pluralism to quash Islamic movements in that country. In contrast to the conclusions of Heilman and Friedman, treatments of the Haredim in Israel by Liebman and Sprinzak stress their fundamental weakness, dependence on and inability to demand more than they were granted by the State soon after its establishment. Ramadan's discussion (III) of Muslim groups in Egypt explicitly portrays them as pressure groups oriented toward specific political interests and operating within and upon a regime whose mix of repression, acculturation and semi-toleration has effectively limited their room for maneuver.

For all this, these volumes cannot be depended on for the systematic organization and coverage of an encyclopedia. There is a clear imbalance in a total of nine essays, comprising more than 300 pages, devoted to Haredi Jewish sects (mostly in Israel) that represent a small minority (of ultra-orthodox) within a minority (religious Jews) within one (small) country. By comparison, there is nothing at all on Islamism in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirates, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya or Morocco.

Still, there is much of value here for the discriminating reader. Instructors will find some of these essays perfectly suited for classroom use. I assign the Heilman and Friedman article in my Israeli Politics course. The essays by Haym Solveitchik, Hugh Roberts and Mumtaz Ahmed are first-rate scholarship that deserve attention by specialists. Many of the contributions are best suited for helping comparatively-minded students of one culture area or country test general propositions about fundamentalism and pietism that have grown out of their own research. In this connection it is both exciting and disheartening to read that the next volume to be produced by the project will be devoted to comparisons across cultures—exciting because there are so many excellent possibilities for rigorous comparative analysis, disheartening because the editors, who have mobilized so much scholarly talent, have not provided (or insisted upon) the intellectual scaffolding necessary for building comparatively based theory.

NOTES:

¹Upper case Roman numerals in parentheses refer to the volume in which the cited material appears.

²Volume III, p. 3 (emphasis in original).

³For reasons of space and because they are generally much less interesting than the substantive chapters, I shall not here have much to say about the introductory and conclusory essays attached to the various Parts of each volume.

⁴Ian S. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 4-6.

⁵Consider, only as an example, "The Book and the Sword: The Nationalist Yeshivot and Political Radicalism in Israel" by Eliezer Don-Yehiya in Volume IV. In that one essay, he refers to "fundamentalists" with the following qualifying adjectives: religious, radical, national, religious nationalist, pure, activist, radical messianic and *halachic*. In addition, he also mentions "messianic mystics," "activist-particularist(s)," "zealots," "ultranationalists" and "nationalist haredim."

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ENGİN DENİZ AKARLI

Washington University in St. Louis

An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, edited by HALİL İNALCIK & DONALD QUATAERT. 1065 pages, maps, figures, tables, chronology, bibliography, glossary, index, appendices, notes. Cambridge University Press: New York, 1994. \$120.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-521-34315-1

THIS VOLUME is a major contribution to Ottoman history. Five leading specialists of Ottoman economic and social history summarize the field, offer new findings and perspectives and prepare the ground for better studies. Rich bibliographies, various maps, charts, tables, a chronology of major events, as well as the list of weights and measures and the glossary of Ottoman terms prepared by İncalik primarily for the period of 1300-1600 enhance the volume greatly.

Halil İncalik, Suraiya Faroqi, Bruce McGowan and Donald Quataert each cover a different period of Ottoman history in chronological order. An appendix (Şevket Pamuk on "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914") surveys the evolution of the Ottoman monetary system from the earliest coins until World War I, the supply and the demand for money and the rates of exchange of the Ottoman coins and *lira* against other leading currencies. Pamuk's study represents a major contribution to the yet embryonic monetary history of Ottoman lands and prepares the ground for future research on prices and wages.

İncalik on 1300 to 1600 in the first 400 pages provides invaluable information distilled from a distinguished career of nearly 60 years of research and teaching. After brief introductory remarks on the formation and expansion of the Ottoman Empire, on the general characteristics of its population and on the Ottoman "economic mind" (pp. 44-54), he discusses in detail the state revenues and expenses, land tenure relations and the rural landscape and international commerce. İncalik is at his best in his lucid descriptions of complex legal, fiscal and administrative arrangements in Ottoman lands and the multifaceted commercial relations between Ottoman and foreign merchants. We recognize once again İncalik's admirable competence in handling Ottoman documents as well as the crucial importance of this impressively rich source of information for historical studies.

İncalik's general comments on Ottoman history, however, leave much to be desired. Basically, he argues that the "Ottoman government's economic measures were not derived from a systematized and coherent theory as in the West, but, as was true in other areas of activity, it [*sic!*] simply followed the long-tested practices and traditions inherited from Middle Eastern society and culture" (p. 52). This "Asiatic"/"Oriental" culture was "doomed" before the rational West, which steadily advanced thanks first to mercantilism and then to the industrial revolution and free market principles (p. 22). The Ottoman central government began to lose control over the provinces once it was hit by a severe crisis around the turn of the 17th century. With an unchanging "mind," a steadily weakening central government and an economy which now entered "the orbit of the Europe-